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I. 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§ 
35-1-82.53(2), -86 (1994), and § 63-46b-16 (1993). 
n. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUE 
Did the Industrial Commission err in its determination that the petitioners, Stampede 
Trucking and the Workers Compensation Fund of Utah (collectively hereinafter "WCF"), did not 
timely submit a medical report from Dr. Scott Knorpp, in violation of Utah Admin. Code R568-1-
4.J? (Brief Appendix A at 1-6; R. at 364-369). 
Standard of review: 
1. Under Utah Code Ann. § 63-46B-16(4)(h)(ii) (1993), the appellate court determines 
whether the agency action at issue is contrary to its own agency rules by applying an intermediate 
standard of review, i.e., whether the agency's application of the relevant rule was reasonable and 
rational. Thorup Bros. Constr. Inc. v Auditing Div.. 860 P.2d 324, 327 (Utah 1993); accord 
Holland v. Career Svcs. Rev. Bd.. 856 P.2d 678 (Utah App. 1993). 
2. Under section 63-46B-16(4)(h)(iii), the appellate review of whether an agency action 
is contrary to the agency's prior practice first requires a petitioner to establish a prima facie case 
that his or her case was contrary to prior practice, which if established, then requires the agency 
to "demonstrate a fair and rational" basis for its departure from precedent. Pickett v. Utah Dept. 
ofComm.. 858 P.2d 187, 191 (Utah App. 1993) (citing SEMCO v. Utah State Tax Comm'n. 849 
P.2d 1167, 1174 (Utah 1993) (Durham, J., dissenting )). 
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3. According to section 63-46B-16(4)(h)(iv), when a claim is brought alleging that an 
agency action is arbitrary and capricious, the appellate court reviews the agency action for 
reasonableness and rationality. Anderson v. Public Service Comm'n, 839 P.2d 822, 824 (Utah 
1992). 
4. Insofar as the Industrial Commission has excluded Dr. Knorpp's report summarily 
without consideration of the merits of its probative value, its action is tantamount, under the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure, to either a Rule 12(b)(6) motion on the pleadings or a Rule 56 motion for 
summary judgment. Therefore, WCF's proffers of evidence must be considered true and all 
reasonable inferences drawn from the evidence in the record must be viewed in a light most favorable 
to their theories in the case. Roark v. Crabtree. 893 P.2d 1058, 1059-60 (Utah 1995); accord 
House v. Armour of America. Inc.. 886 P.2d 542, 545 (Utah App. 1994). 
Accordingly, the standard of review is a correction of error standard without deference to 
the decision of the administrative agency when "the agency has erroneously interpreted or applied the 
law." Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4)(d), -16(4)(h)(iv) (1993); Morton Int'l Inc. v. Tax Comm'n. 
814 P.2d 581, 584 (Utah 1991); accord Mor-Flo Ind. v. Board of Rev.. 817 P.2d 328, 330 (Utah 
App. 1991). 
m. 
DETERMINATIVE LAW 
Utah Admin. Code R568-1-4. Pleadings and Discovery. 
See Appendix I for the complete text; pertinent sections are reproduced below: 
E. When an employer or insurance carrier fails to file an answer within the 30 days provided above, 
the Commission may enter a default against such employer or insurance carrier. The Commission may 
then set the matter for hearing, take evidence bearing on the claim, and enter an Order based on the 
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evidence presented. Such defaults may be set aside by following the procedure outlined in the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure. Said default shall apply to the defendant employer or insurance carrier and 
shall not be construed to deprive the Employers' Reinsurance Fund or the Uninsured Employers' Fund 
of any appropriate defenses. 
H. Upon filing of the Answer, the defendant may commence discovery with appropriate sets of 
interrogatories. Such discovery should focus on the accident event, witnesses, as well as past and 
present medical care. The defendant shall also be entitled to appropriately signed medical releases to 
allow gathering of pertinent medical records. The defendant may also require the applicant to submit 
to an independent medical examination to be conducted by a physician of the defendant's choice. 
Failure of an applicant to comply with such requests may result in the dismissal of a claim or a delay 
in the scheduling of a hearing. 
I 
J. All medical records shall be filed by the employer or its insurance carrier as a single joint exhibit 
at least one week before the scheduled hearing. Claimant must cooperate and submit all pertinent 
medical records contained in his file to the employer or its insurance carrier for the joint exhibit 
submission two weeks in advance of a scheduled hearing. Exhibits are to be placed in an indexed 
binder arranged by care provider in chronological order. Exhibits should include all relevant treatment 
records with the exception of hospital nurses notes. 
^ ^ ^ ^ ^ *P 
Utah Admin. Code R568-1-9. Guidelines for Utilization of Medical Panel. 
See Appendix I for the complete text; pertinent sections are reproduced below: 
Pursuant to Section 35-1-77, U.C.A., the Commission adopts the following guidelines in determining 
the necessity of submitting a case to a medical panel: 
A. A panel will be utilized by the Administrative Law Judge where: 
1. One or more significant medical issues may be involved. Generally a significant medical issue 
must be shown by conflicting medical reports. Significant medical issues are involved when there are: 
(a) Conflicting medical reports of permanent physical impairment which vary more than 5% of the 
whole person, 
(b) Conflicting medical opinions as to the temporary total cutoff date which vary more than 90 days, 
and/or 
(c) Medical expenses in controversy amounting to more than $2,000. 
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Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-88. Rules of evidence and procedure before commission and hearing 
examiner - Admissible evidence. 
Neither the commission nor its hearing examiner shall be bound by the usual common law or statutory 
rules of evidence, or by any technical or formal rules or procedure, other than as herein provided or 
as adopted by the commission pursuant to this act. The commission may make its investigation in 
such manner as in its judgment is best calculated to ascertain the substantial rights of the parties and 
to carry out justly the spirit of the Workmen's Compensation Act. 
The commission may receive as evidence and use as proof of any fact in dispute all evidence deemed 
material and relevant including, but not limited to the following: 
(a) Depositions and sworn testimony presented in open hearings. 
(b) Reports of attending or examining physicians, or of pathologists. 
(c) Reports of investigators appointed by the commission. 
(d) Reports of employers, including copies of time sheets, book accounts or other records. 
(e) Hospital records in the case of an injured or diseased employee. 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16. Judicial review - Formal adjudicative proceedings. 
See Appendix I for the complete text; pertinent sections are reproduced below: 
(4) The appellate court shall grant relief only if, on the basis of the agency's record, it determines that 
a person seeking judicial review has been substantially prejudiced by any of the following: 
(a) the agency action, or the statute or rule on which the agency action is based, is unconstitutional 
on its face or as applied; 
(b) the agency has acted beyond the jurisdiction conferred by any statute; 
(c) the agency has not decided all of the issues requiring resolution; 
(d) the agency has erroneously interpreted or applied the law; 
(e) the agency has engaged in an unlawful procedure or decision-making process, or has failed to 
follow prescribed procedure; 
(f) the persons taking the agency action were illegally constituted as a decision-making body or were 
subject to disqualification; 
(g) the agency action is based upon a determination of fact, made or implied by the agency, that is 
not supported by substantial evidence when viewed in light of the whole record before the court; 
(h) the agency action is: 
(I) an abuse of the discretion delegated to the agency by statute; 
(ii) contrary to a rule of the agency; 
(iii) contrary to the agency's prior practice, unless the agency justifies the inconsistency by giving 
facts and reasons that demonstrate a fair and rational basis for the inconsistency; or 
(iv) otherwise arbitrary or capricious. 
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IV. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
On March 15,1993, Kimball sustained a compensable industrial injury while in the course of his 
i i 
employment as a long-haul truck driver with Stampede. (R. at 252). WCF accepted liability and paid 
Kimball both temporary total disability compensation and medical expenses through July 22, 1993, 
at which time Kimball returned to work. However, Kimball claimed additional temporary total 
disability and medical expenses when his physician removed him from work one year later. These 
benefits were denied by WCF as not medically necessary, reasonable, or causally related to the 
industrial injury. (R. at 10). At issue in the instant case is whether the Industrial Commission erred 
in not admitting as evidence a medical report submitted by WCF at the evidentiary hearing held to 
adjudicate Kimball's claim for the benefits denied by WCF. 
B. Course of Proceedings 
Kimball received medical care and temporary total disability compensation from WCF as 
workers' compensation benefits for the industrial injury he sustained in the course of his employment 
with Stampede on March 15, 1993. After WCF denied his claim for additional temporary total 
disability and medical expenses after July 22, 1994, Kimball filed an Application for Hearing with the 
Industrial Commission on or about November 1, 1994. (R. at 2, 7). 
An administrative law judge (ALJ) conducted an evidentiary hearing on March 7, 1995, and 
entered her Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order on April 19, 1995 (Brief Appendix B 
at 1-18; R. at 252-269). The ALJ concluded as follows: 
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1. Dr. Scott Knorpp's report, submitted by WCF was inadmissable because (a) Dr. Knorpp 
had not examined Kimball; and b) WCF is entitled to only one independent medical examination under 
Utah Admin. Code R568-1-4.H, and having already obtained an independent medical examination 
that was unfavorable to their defense, cannot seek an additional opinion from Dr. Knorpp. (Brief 
Appendix B at 14-17; R. at 265-68). 
WCF filed a Motion for Review on May 18, 1995, arguing the following: 
1. Kimball's claim required referral to a medical panel under Rule 568-1-9. A(b); 
2. Dr. Knorpp's report was relevant and admissible evidence; and 
3. The ALJ's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law are inadequate and not supported by 
a preponderance of the evidence. (R. at 274-83). 
Kimball filed a Response to the Motion for Review, asserting that: 
1. WCF's facts regarding the case were misleading and inaccurate; 
2. The case did not require the utilization of a medical panel; 
3. Dr. Knorpp's report was not admissible evidence; and 
4. The Administrative Law Judge's Findings and Conclusions were adequate and supported 
by a preponderance of the evidence. (R. at 350-60). 
The Industrial Commission denied WCF's Motion for Review on September 29, 1995 (Brief 
Appendix A at 1-6; R. at 364-369). 
WCF filed a Motion for Reconsideration on October 18, 1995, arguing the following issues: 
1. The use of R568-1-4J to exclude Dr. Knorpp's report was contrary to the agency's prior 
practice; 
2. The use of R568-1-4.J to exclude Dr. Knorpp's report was arbitrary and capricious; 
6 
3. Failure to submit the medical expenses controversy to a medical panel constituted a 
violation of R568-1-9; and 
4. Reports generated under Utah Code Ann. § 35-l-108(l)(B)(I) are per se admissible and 
sufficient to create a significant medical issue. (R. at 372-80). 
Kimball filed a Response to the Motion for Reconsideration on November 1, 1995 and argued 
that: 
1. The use of R568-1-4J to exclude Dr. Knorpp's report was appropriate; 
2. The use of R568-1-4.J to exclude Dr. Knorpp's report was not arbitrary or capricious; 
3. Failure to submit the medical expenses controversy to a medical panel did not constitute 
a violation of R568-1-9; and 
4. Reports generated under Utah Code Ann. § 35-l-108(l)(B)(I) are not per se admissible. 
(R. at 451-57). 
The Industrial Commission denied WCF's Motion for Reconsideration on November 1, 1995 
(Brief Appendix C at 1-3; R. at 469-71). 
C. Disposition by the Industrial Commission 
The Industrial Commission entered its Order denying WCF's Motion for Review on 
September 29, 1995 (Brief Appendix A at 1-6; R. at 364-369). The Commission adopted the ALJ's 
Findings of Fact, and appeared to supplement these facts with its own findings from the Commission's 
file (Brief Appendix A at 1; R. at 364), and ruled as follows: 
1. Overruling to the ALJ's conclusion, it determined that Utah Admin. Code R568-1-4.H 
does not limit the admissibility of medical evidence by limiting defendants to one second opinion and 
does not require a personal examination of the applicant in this case. 
2. Dr. Knorpp's report is inadmissable because WCF did not file it with the medical records 
exhibit seven days prior to the date of the hearing as required by R568-1-4 J. 
3. Absent Dr. Knorpp's report, there is no significant medical issue or medical expenses in 
controversy and thus a medical panel is not required under R568-1-9. 
4. The ALJ's Findings and Conclusions, with respect to other issues raised by WCF, were 
supported by the record. 
(Brief Appendix A at 3-5; R. at 366-68). 
The Industrial Commission entered its Order Denying Request for Reconsideration on 
November 15, 1995, reaffirming its prior decision by stating as follows: 
1. There were no circumstances present to justify WCF's violation of the seven-day filing 
period of R568-1-4.J; and 
2. Because there is no medical evidence that establishes a medical issue in controversy, a 
medical panel is not required in this case. 
(Brief Appendix C at 1-3; R. at 469-71). 
V. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
A. General Statement 
1. Kimball sustained a compensable industrial injury on March 15, 1993, when he was 
involved in a motor vehicle accident while driving in the course and scope of his employment with 
Stampede Trucking (R. at 1). 
2. Following the accident, Kimball received workers' compensation benefits from WCF in 
the form of approximately four and one-half months of medical treatment, including over forty 
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physical therapy sessions, (R. at 516) and temporary total disability compensation. (R. at 9). 
3. Kimball was released to return to work on July 22, 1993 (R. at 55). His medical 
condition, with respect to his industrial injuries, reached maximum medical improvement in October, 
1993. (R. at 53). 
4. He continued to work until July 22, 1994, at which time he obtained additional and 
extensive medical treatment for a variety of somatic complaints, including electrophysiologic studies, 
brain and cervical MRI, a repeat CT scan of the head, and over 100 trigger point injections 
administered in fifteen treatment sessions. (R. at 190-91). 
5. WCF denied payment for the additional treatment, as well as temporary total disability 
compensation for the period beginning July 22, 1994, as not being medically necessary or causally 
related to Kimball's March 15, 1993 industrial injury. (Brief Appendix D at 2; R. at 10). 
B. Timeliness 
1. Kimball filed an Application for Hearing on September 22, 1994, to which WCF filed an 
Answer on November 14, 1994. (R. at 2; Brief Appendix D at 1-2, R. at 9-10). 
2. In its Answer, WCF notified Kimball and the Industrial Commission of their intent to have 
the medical expenses at issue reviewed for their causal relationship to the March 15, 1993 industrial 
injury, as well as whether the treatment was reasonable and medically necessary. (Brief Appendix 
Dat2 ;R. at 10). 
3. WCF did not receive Dr. Knorpp's report until March 6, 1995, because: 
a. They had engaged in settlement negotiations with Kimball prior to the hearing; 
however, this process was complicated by Kimball's third party claim against the driver at 
fault in the March 15,1993 accident. (Brief Appendix E at 17-18, R. at 489-90; R. at 375-76) 
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b. They had difficulty receiving all relevant records, including a copy of the deposition 
of Kimball's treating physician and additional records from Good Samaritan Hospital, who 
refused to release records to WCF because of their denial of liability. (Brief Appendix E at 
57, R. at 529; R. at 375-6, 383-401). Counsel for Kimball sent the deposition by fax on 
March 3, 1995. (R. at 383). He promised to obtain the medical records but they were not 
received by the Industrial Commission until March 27, 1995. (Brief Appendix E at 57; R. at 
529) (Brief Appendix H; R. at 22). 
4. Consequently, WCF delayed obtaining the review of medical records from Dr. Scott 
Knorpp in the hope of receiving a more complete set of medical records and other documents. WCF 
did not receive Dr. Knorpp's report until March 6, 1995, and sent it promptly by fax to Kimball's 
counsel. (Brief Appendix E at 5; R. at 477). 
5. WCF submitted Dr. Knorpp's report to the ALJ at the hearing for inclusion in the medical 
records exhibit as evidence countervailing the compensability of Kimball's medical treatment and 
ensuing temporary total disability. (Brief Appendix F at 1; R. at 185) (Brief Appendix E at 5, R. at 
477). 
6. The ALJ marked Dr. Knorpp's report as a separate defense exhibit (Brief Appendix F at 
1; R. at 185). She later ruled that the report was inadmissable under Rule 568-1-4.H, reasoning that 
Dr. Knorpp did not personally examine Kimball and his report was a second independent medical 
examination. The ALJ did not consider the issue of timeliness under Rule 568-1-4. J because it was 
not an issue at the hearing. (Brief Appendix B at 14-17; R. at 265-68) (Brief Appendix E at 46-47, 
58; R. at 518-19, 530). 
7. The ALJ admitted Kimball's submission of additional medical records post-hearing on 
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March 27, 1995. (Brief Appendix H at 1; R. at 22). 
C. Waiver 
1. On February 14, 1995, WCF notified Kimball by letter that the medical records exhibit 
would be available one week prior to the evidentiary hearing held March 7, 1995. (Brief Appendix 
at G; R. at 460). Counsel elected to put off receiving and reviewing the exhibit until the day of the 
hearing. (Brief Appendix E at 3; R. at 475). 
2. Counsel for Kimball objected to admission of Dr. Knorpp's report based on its status as 
a review of medical files without a personal examination. (Brief Appendix E at 8-15; R. at 480-87) 
3. At the hearing, counsel for Kimball did not object to admission of Dr. Knorpp's report 
based on an allegation of untimely filing under the provisions of Rule 568-1-4. J. (Brief Appendix E 
at 8-15; R. at 480-87). 
4. Counsel for Kimball raised the allegation of untimely filing for the first time as a cursory 
argument in his Response to WCFs Motion for Review. (R. at 355-56) 
VI. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The Industrial Commission incorrectly applied Utah Admin. Code R568-1-4.J to exclude Dr. 
Knorpp's medical report proffered by WCF at the evidentiary hearing held to adjudicate Kimball's 
workers' compensation claims. Through its order, the Commission acted contrary to agency practice 
and contrary to the process followed by the ALJ regarding Kimball's submission of medical evidence 
post-hearing. At the evidentiary hearing, Kimball did not raise the issue of untimely submission of 
Dr. Knorpp's report when proffered by WCF, nor did the ALJ make any ruling based on timeliness. 
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Indeed, the ALJ held the medical records exhibit open post-hearing to allow Kimball to submit 
additional records. The ALJ's actions were in keeping with the common practice of the agency in 
freely accepting medical records less than seven days prior to the hearing, giving effect to the essential 
purpose of the administrative hearing as a forum for gathering all pertinent facts necessary for a fair 
and reasonable decision for all parties. 
The Commission, having departed from prior practice, has no fair or rational basis for doing 
so. It applied a harsh sanction for which Rule R568-1-4. J has no provision. Although conceding 
the rule may be relaxed under certain circumstances, the Commission failed to articulate what these 
circumstances are that merit exception. Furthermore, the rule itself does not provide for standards 
by which such exceptional circumstances can be judged. The Commission's proposed alternative to 
addressing exceptions or relaxation of the rule, by way of joint stipulation by all parties and approval 
of the ALJ, presents an untenable situation in which either party has the power to arbitrarily prevent 
admission of essential medical evidence. 
In addition, Kimball waived his right to object to Dr. Knorpp's report based on an allegation 
of untimeliness because he failed to raise the issue at the evidentiary hearing when the report was 
proffered by WCF. He is unable to show that his position was prejudiced by not receiving the report 
one week before to the hearing, having chosen to receive the entire medical records exhibit itself the 
day of the hearing. 
The Commission, having deprived WCF of medical evidence essential to their defense, has 
failed to administer the Workers' Compensation Act in a fair and impartial manner. 
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vn. 
ARGUMENT 
A. THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION'S APPLICATION OF UTAH ADMIN. CODE 
R568-1-4.J TO EXCLUDE DR. KNORPFS REPORT IS CONTRARY TO AGENCY 
PRACTICE, WITHOUT A FAIR AND RATIONAL BASIS AND CONTRARY TO THE 
PROCESS FOLLOWED BY THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE REGARDING THE 
APPLICANT'S POST-HEARING SUBMISSION OF MEDICAL EVIDENCE. 
Utah Admin. Code R568-1-4J states in relevant part as follows: 
All medical records shall be filed by the employer or its insurance carrier as a single 
joint medical exhibit at least one week before the scheduled hearing. Claimant must 
cooperate and submit all pertinent medical records contained in his file to the 
employer or its insurance carrier for the joint exhibit submission two weeks in advance 
of the scheduled hearing. . . . 
The Industrial Commission, in its Order Denying the Motion for Review, incorrectly applied 
R568-1-4.J in its determination that Dr. Knorpp's report was inadmissible. In doing so, the 
Commission ignored the circumstances at the hearing of the case at bar and the agency's prior practice 
of freely admitting medical records, either at the hearing or post-hearing, for inclusion into the 
medical records exhibit. 
First, the ALJ, while mindful of the Commission's administrative rules relating to medical 
reports, was concerned only as to the substance of Dr. Knorpp's report as a file review and that it was 
a second independent medical report procured by WCF. She did not question the fact that Kimball 
had received the report by fax the day before, or that WCF was submitting it at the hearing rather 
than having it included in the previously submitted medical exhibit. (Brief Appendix E at 5; R. at 
477). The ALJ's actions with respect to Dr. Knorpp's report is in keeping with the routine agency 
practice of supplementing the medical exhibit at the hearing with additional records that were 
unavailable when the medical records exhibit was assembled seven days prior to the hearing. Indeed, 
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in the instant case, the ALJ held the medical exhibit open for a post-hearing addition of records from 
one of Kimball's out-of-state providers that WCF had been unable to obtain. Kimball had hand-carried 
those records to Utah but counsel did not bring them to the hearing. (Brief Appendix E at 57; R. at 
529). These records were not received by the Commission until several weeks later. (Brief Appendix 
H a t l ; R . at 22). 
Furthermore, a careful scrutiny of cases decided by the Industrial Commission, as well as 
published case law, has failed to yield a single case in which medical records were deemed 
inadmissible simply because they were not submitted as part of the medical records exhibit one week 
prior to the hearing.1 As a matter of public policy, administrative hearings dealing with workers' 
compensation claims emphasize content over form, i.e., the essential purpose of the hearing is to 
serve as a forum for gathering all pertinent information helpful to the ALJ in making a reasonable and 
fair decision for all parties. To this end, the Legislature has specifically provided for far fewer 
procedural constraints in Industrial Commission workers' compensation hearings than may be found 
in other forums: 
Neither the commission nor its hearing examiner shall be bound by the usual common-
law or statutory rules of evidence, or by any technical or formal rules of procedure 
. . . . The Commission may make its investigation in such manner as in its judgment 
is best calculated to ascertain the substantial rights of the parties and to carry out 
justly the spirit of the Workers' Compensation Act. 
Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-88 (1994) (emphasis added). 
*By contrast, appellate case law has dealt with issues regarding the substance and reliability of 
medical records. See, e,g,, Willardson v. Industrial Comm'n. 904 P.2d 671, 675 (Utah 1995) 
(despite no analysis and background to statements made in physicians' Summary of Medical 
Record, such forms sufficient to support finding of medical controversy); Ashcroft v. Industrial 
Comm'q 855 P.2d 267, 270 (Utah App. 1993) (mere mention of impairment rating in doctors' 
record not sufficient evidence to support a medical controversy over impairment rating). 
14 
Having departed from the agency practice of routinely accepting medical records at the 
hearing in its strict application of R568-1-4J, the Commission failed to "demonstrate a fair and 
rational" basis for its decision. Pickett v. UtahDept. of Comm., 858 P.2d 187, 191 (UtahApp. 1993) 
(citation omitted). The Commission, in its findings of fact, stated that WCF failed to move for a 
continuance so that Dr. Knorpp's report could be properly admitted in accordance with the seven-day 
period. (Brief Appendix A at 2, 4; R. at 365, 367). Such a scenario would certainly have caused 
undue hardship on Kimball, who had traveled from Indiana, by delaying the adjudicative process even 
further by rescheduling the hearing, to say nothing of the burden placed on the Commission's 
administrative system. Advocating a continuance as a "cure" merely to bring submission of the report 
in line with the seven-day period is scarcely a fair and rational solution. 
Additionally, the Commission conceded that "under appropriate circumstances, the 
requirements of the rule may be relaxed by agreement of the parties and approval of the ALJ. No 
circumstances justifying Stampede's violation of Rule R568-1-4.J are present in this case." (Brief 
Appendix C at 2; R. at 470). However, they failed to articulate what circumstances would be 
appropriate, opting instead to note that WCF did not meet these circumstances because they did not 
gather their evidence in a timely manner. (Brief Appendices A at 4, C at 2; R. at 367, 470). The 
Commission is attempting to adhere to standards that simply do not exist in the language of the rule 
itself, an action that is fundamentally unfair. See Athay v. Department of Bus. Reg.. 626 P.2d 965, 
966 (Utah 1981) (holding that a statute requiring psychologists to have a degree in a "primarily 
psychological" program failed to establish an objective, identifiable standard for use in judging 
prospective licensee's qualifications). 
The Commission's ostensible solution to relaxing the rule presents a particularly irrational and 
15 
unworkable situation. Either party can unilaterally and arbitrarily prevent admission of essential 
medical evidence simply by refusing to stipulate to its submission less than seven days before the 
hearing. However, in the instant case, the actions of the ALJ and Kimball satisfied the 
requirements of the Commission's contorted solution. At the hearing, opposing counsel and the 
ALJ voiced no objection to Dr. Knorpp's report insofar as it was submitted at the hearing rather 
than seven days prior, thereby offering the tacit agreement to relax the seven-day rule. (Brief 
Appendix E at 5; R. at 477). 
Furthermore, the Commission's use of the term "disclosure requirements" to describe the 
provisions of R568-1-4.J is inapposite. A plain reading of subsection 4. J indicates its purpose is to 
provide an organizational structure upon the assembling of the joint medical exhibit. Indeed, the 
rule's only "disclosure" requirement seems to be imposed on the claimant and not the defendant: 
"Claimant must cooperate and submit all pertinent records contained in his file to the employer or its 
insurance carrier for the joint exhibit submission two weeks in advance of a scheduled hearing." Utah 
Admin. Code R568-1-4.J. "Disclosure" is more suitably applied to the section of the rule that 
addresses discovery and interrogatories, as found in R568-1-4.H. 
Undisputedly, R568-1-4.J confers upon defendants the responsibility of assembling, seven 
days prior to the hearing, the often voluminous medical records in a joint exhibit, which is then bound, 
paginated, and arranged in chronological order for ease of use by the ALJ and counsel for both 
parties. However, subsection 4. J is silent on the consequences of submission of records beyond the 
seven-day period prior to the scheduled date of hearing, or to any discretion granted to the Industrial 
Commission in granting sanctions. 
In comparison, under a different subsection of the same rule, the Commission has explicit 
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discretion to grant a default against the employer or its insurance carrier for failure to file an Answer 
to an applicant's Application for Hearing within the prescribed thirty days. Utah Admin. Code R568-
1-4.E. Similarly, the Commission has discretion to dismiss a claim or delay scheduling of a hearing 
if the applicant fails to comply with discovery requests. Utah Admin. Code R568-1-4.H. Had the 
seven-day period been intended to be applied strictly to limit the admission of evidence, the 
promulgators of the rule would have included provisions for exceptions and sanctions imposed for 
noncompliance. 
However, in the case at bar the Commission imposes the harshest of sanctions, one not 
provided for in the rule. The resulting summary dismissal of WCF's defenses is fundamentally unfair. 
Such action is not rational in light of the spirit and intent of Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-88 (1993), which 
states, in part with our emphasis, that 
The commission may make its investigation in such manner as in its judgment is best 
calculated to ascertain the substantial rights of the parties and to carry out justly the 
spirit of the Workmen's Compensation Act. The commission may receive as evidence 
and use as proof of any fact in dispute all evidence deemed material and relevant 
including, but not limited to the following: 
(a) Depositions and sworn testimony presented in open hearings. 
(b) Reports of attending or examining physicians, or of pathologists. 
(c) Reports of investigators appointed by the commission. 
(d) Reports of employers, including copies of time sheets, book accounts or other records. 
(e) Hospital records in the case of an injured or diseased employee. 
Accordingly, the Commission has failed to show that its use of R568-1-4.J was done in a fair 
and rational manner. 
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B. KIMBALL WAIVED HIS RIGHT TO OBJECT TO DR. KNORPF S REPORT BASED 
ON UTAH ADMIN. COPE R568-1-4. J BECAUSE HE FAILED TO RAISE THE ISSUE OF 
THE REPORT'S TIMELY FILING AT THE EVIDENTIARY HEARING. 
As stated supra, WCF filed the medical records exhibit with the Industrial Commission in 
advance of the hearing in accordance with Rule 568-1-4. J without Dr. Knorpp's report, which it 
instead presented at the hearing to the ALJ. However, Kimball made no objection at tbe bearing as 
to the timeliness of the proffered evidence. Instead, the thrust of counsel's objections to the 
admissibility of Dr. Knorpp's report and to which he devoted extensive discourse, centered exclusively 
on the fact that Dr. Knorpp's report was based solely on his review of Kimball's medical records 
without a personal examination and that WCF had already obtained an independent medical 
examination. (Brief Appendix E at 5, 8-14; R. at 477, 480-86). When WCF informed the ALJ that 
the report had been sent by fax to counsel the day before, counsel, as well as the ALJ, offered no 
comment or objection. (Brief Appendix E at 5; R. at 477). 
It is a well-settled principle of law that "if a party fails to raise an issue and present evidence 
regarding the same, it has waived the right to do so." Hilton Hotel v. Industrial Comm'n. 897 P.2d 
352, 356 (Utah App. 1995) (citing Chevron U.S.A.. Inc. v. State Tax Comm'n. 847 P.2d 418, 421 
(Utah App. 1993)). See Alvin G. Rhodes Pump Sales v. Industrial Comm'n. 681 P.2d 1244, 1249 
(Utah 1984) (stating that issues must be first raised in administrative tribunal); cf State v. Lopez. 886 
P.2d 1105,1113 (Utah 1994) (stating that issues not raised during trial were waived at the appellate 
level absent a tbreat to appellant's liberty). In tbe case at bar, Kimball first raised tbe issue of timely 
filing of the report in his Response to the Motion for Review. (R. at 355-56). As previously stated, 
Kimball's objections to Dr. Knorpp's report was limited to its form and substance. (R. at 480-84). 
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C. KIMBALL WAS NOT PREJUDICED OR DENIED DUE PROCESS BY THE FILING 
OF DR. KNORPP1 S REPORT AT THE HEARING. 
Kimball can demonstrate no prejudice for not having received a copy of Dr. Knorpp's report 
one week before the hearing. Had the report been included in the medical records exhibit, he would 
not, by his own choice, have seen the report until the day of the hearing. Counsel for Kimball opted 
to have WCF deliver the exhibit to him on the day of hearing.2 He even conditioned the ALJ's 
admission of the exhibit into evidence on his "further review over the next couple of days." (Brief 
Appendix E at 3; R. at 475). He actually received Dr. Knorpp's report, by fax, before he received the 
medical records exhibit, and came to the hearing prepared to proffer evidence to countervail Dr. 
Knorpp's report. (Brief Appendix E at 12-14; R. at 484-86). 
While arguably Kimball may have been better informed by having had access to Dr. Knorpp's 
report one week prior to the hearing, he would also have been better informed by availing himself of 
the medical records exhibit one week prior to the hearing as well. It seems rather disingenuous for 
counsel to complain that he was extremely prejudiced by not having had the "chance to properly read, 
review, or analyze a lengthy medical report," (R. at 465) when he failed to have the same opportunity 
to do so with the medical records exhibit. (Brief Appendix E at 3; R. at 475). 
D. THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION'S ERRONEOUS USE OF R568-1-4J DEPRIVED 
WCF OF A REASONABLE OPPORTUNITY TO PRESENT ITS CASE. 
The Industrial Commission, by implication in its orders, has properly found that Dr. Knorpp's 
report constitutes a prima facie showing of a medical controversy over a significant medical issue, 
2On February 14, 1995, WCF notified counsel for Kimball by letter regarding assembly and 
access to the medical records file. The letter concluded by saying "a copy may be obtained at our 
office one week prior to the hearing or will be delivered to you at the time of the hearing." (Brief 
Appendix G; R. at 460). Notably, Kimball pointed to this letter in his Response to the Motion for 
Reconsideration as evidence of WCF's awareness of Utah Admin. Code R568-1-4.J. 
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thus requiring a referral to a medical panel to resolve the conflict. (Brief Appendix A at 5; R. at 368). 
The Workers1 Compensation Act gives the Industrial Commission discretion to determine 
whether a medical panel is necessary for impartial resolution of medical issues. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 35-l-77(l)(a) (1994). However, the Commission has promulgated an administrative rule to 
mandate submission of "significant" medical questions that are in controversy in workers' 
compensation claims, thereby limiting discretion for those types of medical issues. Accordingly, 
Utah Admin. Code R568-1-9 states, in relevant part, as follows: 
Pursuant to Section 35-1-77, U.C.A., the Commission adopts the following guidelines in determining 
the necessity of submitting a case to a medical panel: 
A. A panel will be utilized by the Administrative Law Judge where: 
1. One or more significant medical issues may be involved. 
Generally a significant medical issue must be shown by conflicting medical reports. Significant 
medical issues are involved when there are: 
(a) Conflicting medical reports of permanent physical impairment which vary 
more than 5% of the whole person, 
(b) Conflicting medical opinions as to the temporary total cutoff date which 
vary more than 90 days, and/or 
(c) Medical expenses in controversy amounting to more than $2,000. 
Rule 568-1-9.A. 1 does not define what are "conflicting medical reports." That issue was 
explored by the Utah Supreme Court in Willardson v. Industrial Comm'n. 904 P.2d 671 (Utah 1995). 
In Willardson. the Court determined that fill-in-the-blank Industrial Commission forms entitled 
"Summary of Medical Records," and containing very brief information, constituted sufficient medical 
evidence to create a controversy over a significant medical issue, i.e., medical causation. Id- at 674-
75. The Court went on to say that the summary forms were not intended to provide the analysis and 
background information which the Commission and defendant employer/carrier contended was 
essential to a report creating a medical controversy. Id. at 675. A reasoned reading ofWillardson 
shows the Court's broad interpretation of "conflicting medical report." 
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In I li< - ill1! in! in i I in mi I in iip|ii viinqfirmi in! iiiiiii- ,111 rxlniihiu1 wxww 1 if the medical records 
and a thorough analysis of what treat ;;•*';; I! mid ;!:;;;. .isostic studies would be considered reasonable 
medically necessary and causal!} related to Kimball's industnal industrial injuiy I B u d A |iptiii(llr« I ' 
a t i«i3- R# at 185 . gjy Certainly his analysis and review is sufficient to bring his report within the 
language of R568-1-9 as a "conflicting medical report" of a "significant medical issue/'3 
1 i n . 
CONCLUSION 
I he Industrial Commission excluaec . -. ,f.v. •-... . -.- -
bar through its application of Utah Admin. Code R 5 6 8 - 1 - 4 J , thereby stripping W C F oi e v i d t — 
^M?*1 ' a; 10 UN ueu*"r-r Hc-veve*" X V r ~ m m i s s i o n ^ application of the n ^ e was T»nt*-?rv +~ +v^ 
hearing. The Commission s alidated this prior practice by accepting medical recc 
the applicant sevuial weeks alien lln. i uml 11111 a\\ lliiMiiiig. 
The Commission can point to no fair or rational reason for its discriminatory application of 
Rule 568-1-4.J. The Commission is applying a harsh sanction which is not prov . * •, i;.w ; J e 
: 1 its • :> Pi 11 f 1 actice. "I he Commission concedes it makes exceptions, but provides no workable 
standards for the exceptions by which the parties can govern their conduct. 
>ui)rnf\iK>n. nor would he ha\ _ ibmission at the hearing Thus, he waiver. 
such objection by not mak ng 
!1 incurree more tLm $15,000 in medical expenses after July 1994, responsibility for 
:
 ;sden-..-.: v i 79-84). 
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Therefore, the Commission has failed to administer the Workers' Compensation Act in a fair 
and impartial manner in order to determine the substantial rights of all parties, as is its statutory 
charge. This Court should reverse the decision of the Industrial Commission, admit Dr. Knorpp's 
report as medical evidence, and remand this case back to the Industrial Commission for referral to 
a medical panel for evaluation of the medical issues in controversy. 
DATED this 2,/ day of TunnJj^ , 1996. 
lesR. Black, PC. 
)-Counsel for Petitioners Stampede Trucking and 
"the Workers Compensation Fund of Utah 
WORKERS COMPENSATION FUND OF UTAH 
Barbara W. Sharp 
Co-Counsel for Petitioners Stampede Trucking and 
the Workers Compensation Fund of Utah 
Carrie T. Taylor 
Co-Counsel for Petitioners Stampede Trucking and 
the Workers Compensation Fund of Utah 
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Applicant * ORDER DENYING 
* MOTION FOR REVIEW 
STAMPEDE TRUCKING arid WORKER^ * 
COMPENSATION FUND OF UTAH, * Case No. 94-0967 
* 
IJetei ' i jJdii l::s * 
Stampede Trucking and The Workers Compensation Fund of Utah 
(referred to jointly as "Stampede") ask The Industrial Commission 
of Utah to review the Administrative Law Judge's award of benefits 
to John R. Kimball pursuant to the Utah Workers' Compensation Act. 
The Industrial Commission exercises jurisdiction over this 
motion for review pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-12, Utah Code 
z^ n s:*c;_.-„fl? c-
 a ^ nt-*1- ^'-i n , Code R568-1-4.M. 
ISSUES UNDER REVIEW 
Stampede raises the following issues in its motion for review: 
1 ) Is Dr. Knorpp's report admissible as evidence in this 
proceeding? 2) Should the ALJ have referred Mr. Kimball's claim, to 
a medical panel? 3) Are the ALJ's findings and conclusions 
sufficient? 
FINPINgg OF FACT 
The rial C C ^ U L ^ ^ ^ I adopts the ALJ ' s exhaustive 
recitation cr the subsidiary facts regarding Mr. Kimball's claim. 
The Industrial Commission's file provides additional information on 
the procedural aspects of this case. The facts material to this 
motion for review are summarized below: 
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C:. y.^ .i... x„ Kimball was :i n a traffic accident while 
working for Stampede. He received medical treatment for various 
injuries, 'including neck and upper back strain. He returned to 
work during August 1993. Stampede paid work^^-- m m n e n s a t i on 
benpcit-c, ->--; r'-T from Mr. Kimball's accident. 
Several months later, Mr. Kimball 1: egan suffering severe 
headaches. During July 1994, on instruction from his physician, 
Mr. Kimba] 1 left work and commenced an additional course of medical 
treatment. Mr. Kimball then requested additional workers' 
compensation benefits from Stampede on the theory that his 
continuing medical complaints were caused by his prior industrial 
accident. Mr Kimball's claim was supported by the medical 
opinions of his treating physicians 
Stampede denied Mr. Kimball's claim, and employed Dr. Yelton to 
perform \ rhat is commonly referred to as an "independent medical 
evaluation" ("IME") of Mr. Kimball's medical condition." In the 
meantime, Mr. Kimball submitted an application for hearing to tl: le 
I ndi i s t r i a 1 Comm is-' 
On October - .994, Dr. Yelton submitted his report ;. :: 
Stampede. Dr Yelton concurred with Mr. Kimball's treating 
physicians that Mr. Kimball's continuing medical problems were due 
to his prior industrial accident. Dr. Yelton also concluded l " 
Mr. Kimball's medical care was reasonably necessary. 
On November 1, 1994, the Industrial Commission's Adjudication 
Division instructed Stampede to answer Mr, Kimball '-s application 
for hearing. Stampede did so on November 14, 1994, generally 
denying liability. On January 3, 1995, the Adjudication Division 
scheduled Mr Kimball's claim for hearing . r: Marc;: 7, 1995, 
jn February 2 J , 1995, ^ . d ^ e u r -^ I U V - ^ ui. ^ iuipi. . . ;tr 
Kimball's medical records. Dr. Knoxpp's report was :. 
submitted to opposing counsel until 4:3" p. i, on March 6, 1995, the 
day before the heai Th~ report was no: included in Stampede's 
•: I exhibit. ime did Stampede request a continuance ." 
u.i nearing. 
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:,' .earing en Mr Kimball's claim, Stampede offered Dr. 
Knorpp's repcr". ;:* evidence. The ALJ "refused to accept the 
report on the grounds it lacked foundation a nd contravened 
Indi istrial Commission rules. The ALJ also denied Stampede's 
request that Mr. Kimball's claim be referred to a medical panel. 
The ALJ i lltimately ruled that Mr. Kimball's continuing medical 
problems were the result of his industrial accident,, that his 
medical care through 1994 was necessary to treat his industrial 
injuries, and that Mr. Kimball was entitled to the requested 
medical benefits and disability compensation, also through 19 94. 
|I) I S CUSS I ON AND CONCLUSIONS 01= ' LAW 
Stampede argues: II ) the ALJ erred in rejecting Dr. Knorpp's 
report; 2) The ALJ erred in not appointing a medical panel; and 3) 
The ALJ's findings and conclusions are: insufficient. The 
Industrial Commissi on w^  ~! ^  address each ^ ' ---- ;r;sues 
JL Dr. Knorpp's report 
The ALJ expressed two reasons for rejecting Dr. Knorpp's 
i eport. The first reason was that because Dr. Knorpp was not given 
an opportunity to personally examine Mr. Kimball, the report lacked 
sufficient foundation to warrant admission as evidence. 
While the Industrial Commission would not have rejected the 
r eport in question solely because Dr. Knorpp did not, personally 
examine Mr. Kimball,, the Industrial Commission agrees with the ALJ 
that tihe persuasive force of the report is severely diminished for 
•eason. Thus, even if the report had been admitted, it would 
be entitled to very little weight. 
The .ALJ's second reason for rejecting Dn Knorpp's report 
relates to the Industrial Commission's Rule R568-1-4.H: 
mhe defendant may also require the applicant to 
sucnm to an independent medical examination to 
rnnHnrfp1 - /hvsician of the defendant's cho-' -<=• 
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The ALJ interpieted the foregoing : J.e ;._• limi:. ,.ng Stampede to 
only one : The ALJ reasoned that since Stampede had previously 
obtained an IME from Dr. Yelton, :' - " ; - subrritted a second 
repc v *: f r " n* ^ •-  T'norpp . 
In the Industrial Commission's view, Ri lie R568 1-4.H does not 
control the admissibility of Dr. Knorpp's report. Instead, the 
rule only explains and limits an applicant's duty tc cooperate with 
IME's on behalf of defendants. The rule does not limit the 
admissibi 1 i ty of other medical evidence, such as Dr. Knorpp's 
report. .lsequently, Rule R568-1-4.H does not support the ALJ's 
rej ection of Dr Knorpp's report. 
.ne not adopting the ALJ 's specific reasons for rejecting 
jL-vnorpp's report, the Industrial Commission nevertheless 
concludes that under the circumstances of this case, the report is 
inadmissible becaus*- the Industrial Commission's Rule R568-1-4.J 
required Stampede * file all medical records at least one week 
prior to the hearing. Dr.. Knorpp's report, which was not filed 
ur.td1 th° ^F1^ ^  ^ ~ b^a>--:--r- * -< r-4 - ^ »] i „„;
 wj th Ri iJ e R 568 ] -4. J. 
The Industrial Commission's rules are not intended or applied 
to deprive parries ~ reasonable opportunity to present their 
cases. However,, in this case Stampede failed to take timely steps 
to gather its evidence and as a consequence was unable to meet the 
disclosure requirements set forth in the Industrial Commission's 
rules. In particular, even though Stampede knew in October 19 94 
that the report :i t: had obtained from. Dr. Yelton was unfavorable, 
Stampede did not commission Dr. Knorpp's report until only eight 
days prior to the hearing. The report was not completed until five 
days prior to hearing and Stampede did not provide a copy to 
opposing counsel until the eve of the hearing. The ALJ did not 
receive the report until the hearing itself. Furthermore, Stampede 
did not request that the hearing be continued to a] low for proper 
disclosure of ^"^ "^ -ooxt 
Under these circumstances, the industrial Commission finds no 
basis for excusing Stampede from the requirements of Rule R568-1-
4.J. The Industrial Commission therefore concludes that 
Knorpp' s repor*" i ^  _: "adm issible . 
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II, Referral to a medical panel. 
Stampede contends t:.e A^J shou^i have referred Mr Kimball's 
claim to a medical panel for review. Section 35-1 "'• c: r" ie Utah 
Workers ;ompensation Act grants tr.tr Industrial Commission 
discretion tc convene medical panels. Tit Industrial Commission 
exercises such discretion according *~ * 0i:?~ DC*:G_-.Q
 W^J ch 
r
'
v
^
? ;
^^ - ^  ™ateri a3! ^^ ^*~ ^  -- f" n 1 cws : 
panel * be itilized by t:>: "-i-iinistrative Law 
* ?
 :i^ where : 
r)ne or more signniL^. --t mo v >~ 
.. - 3enerally a significant T.eu^ c-T * " :e must be 
anew:, i.^  jonflicting - . jal reports ^^gnificant 
medical issuer are involved when there are: 
(c) medical expenses in co-
more than $2 0 00 
In this case, Dr. Knorpp's report is the only support for 
Stampede's claim, that a significant medical issue exists. For 
reasons discussed above, Dr Ki :i : rpp's report has not been accepted 
as evidence in this matter. A] 1 other medical evidence indicates 
that the medical treatment in question has been reasonable and 
necessary. The Industrial Commission therefore concludes that no 
significant medical issue exists and that no medical panel is 
necessary. 
1 1 1 Sufficiency of the ALJ's findings and decision. 
Stampede contends the ALJ failed to address the following 
issues; 1) What was the condition for which Mr. Kimball was being 
treated during July , 1994 forward? 2) Was the condition medically 
causally related to the industrial accident of March 15, 1993? 3) 
Was the treatment rendered, reasonable and medically necessary? II ) 
Was the Applicant temporarily totally disabled from July 22, 1994 
forward as a direct result of the industrial injury? 
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The foregoing questions are answered :i n any fair reading of 
the ALJ's decision, but for purposes of clarity, the Industrial 
Commission finds and concludes as follows; Since July 1994, Mr. 
1
 '. •'•^-•all has bee^ treated for frontal occipital headaches, severe 
:..-•.* and shoulder -^ain, and myofacial syndrome. Such conditions 
were medically caused by the industrial accident or March 15, 1993. 
The treatment rendered on behalf of Mr. V T.ball through 1994 was 
enable and medically necessary. Mr ~';mball was temporarily 
•". Iv disabled a fter July 22 ] 994 -• - '-ast Jam la ry 1 
ORDER 
•ies St 5P'^ !,oricn for review. It is so ordered. 
Dated this c? y day of September, 1995 
^K 
Stephen M. Hadle 
Chairjr^n 
Thomas R. Carlson 
Commissioner 
jg^ 
Colleen S. Colton 
Commissioner 
N O T I C E v i Jir-rgj/vu fs.fviriTS 
Any party may ask the Industrial Commission to reconsider this 
order by filing a request for reconsideration with the Commission 
within 2 0 days of the date of this order. .",; ternatively, any party 
may appeal this order to the Utah Court jf Appeals by filing a 
petition for re^ n ew wj th that coi n: t: w:i tl ' • " ~ d a y s of the date of 
this order. 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
1 certify thaL a copy cf „ne foregoing Order Denying Motion 
For Review in the matter of John R. Kimball, Case No. i<4-09-~. was 
mailed first cl^ss postage prepaid this^ff day of September 1 -95, 
to the following: 
JOHN K. KIMBALL 
107 NAVAHO DRIVE 
VINCENT: *. 4 7591 
387 WEST CENTER STT~7:'--"^  
OREM, UTAH 84057 
CARRIE - "AYLOR 
3 92 EAST 6400 SOUTH 
P 0 BOX 57929 
-
q
" ~ T.ATT? CTT'' u i ^ H 8 4 1 5 7 - 0 9 2 9 
-Adetf^Su. t lei - Mit che 11 
Support Specialist 
Industrial Commission of Utah 
o«Jers\94-0967 
TabB 
r> -/7f^ 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
Case No. 94-967 
RECEIVED 
APR 1 f| 1^5 
JOHN R. KIMBALL, * 
Applicant, * FINDINGS OF FACT 
VS. * CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
STAMPEDE TRUCKING/WORKERS * AND ORDER 
COMPENSATION FUND OF UTAH, * 
* 
Defendants. * 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
HEARING: Hearing Room 334, Industrial Commission of Utah, 
160 East 300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah, on March 
7, 1995 at 10:00 o'clock a.m. Said hearing was 
pursuant to Order and Notice of the Commission. 
BEFORE: Barbara Elicerio, Administrative Law Judge. 
APPEARANCES: The applicant was present and was represented by T. 
Jeffery Cottle, Attorney. 
The defendants were represented by Carrie Taylor, 
Attorney. 
This case involves a claim for additional temporary total 
compensation and medical expenses related to a work-related March 
15, 1993 motor vehicle accident. The carrier initially accepted 
liability and paid temporary total compensation (at $167.00/week, 
totaling $3,077.57) and medical expenses from March 16, 1993 
through July 22, 1993. Thereafter, the applicant returned to work 
and worked through July 22, 1994. At that time, the applicant was 
taken off work by his treating physician, due to neck and upper 
back symptoms similar to what he had had during 1993, after the 
industrial motor vehicle accident. The applicant remained off work 
from July 22, 1994 until the date of hearing, and received medical 
care during that period of time. At the hearing, the applicant 
indicated that he had not yet been released to return to work by 
his physician and was continuing with medical care related to the 
industrial motor vehicle accident. The applicant claims additional 
temporary total compensation from July 22, 1994, the date that he 
began his off-work status again, through the date of hearing, and 
continuing until he becomes medically stable. The applicant also 
claims additional medical expenses for additional treatment 
reinstituted on July 22, 1994, related to neck and upper back pain 
associated with headaches. 
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The carrier denies that the applicant is entitled to 
additional temporary total compensation and medical expenses, 
because his treating physician, Dr. T. Fenwick, released him to 
return to work in July of 1993 and found him medically stable in 
October of 1993. In addition/ the carrier cites a medical report 
prepared by a Dr. S. Knorpp, a physician chosen by the carrier to 
review the applicant's medical records and answer specific 
questions, which indicates that most of the treatment after July of 
1994 was either unnecessary or unrelated to the March 15, 1993 
industrial motor vehicle accident, and which indicates that the 
applicant was not disabled after July of 1994. The carrier 
indicates that it believes that the applicant sought out the 
additional medical care and time off work in order to increase his 
special damages for a third party law suit that he is pursuing 
against the insurance carrier for the driver of the vehicle that 
struck him on March 15, 1993. The carrier points out that the 
applicant was able to return to his regular work shortly following 
the industrial accident and was able to continue working for a full 
year thereafter. Based on this history, the motivation to increase 
his recovery in his third party action, and the opinions of Dr. S. 
Knorpp, the carrier contends that the additional treatment and time 
off work is unrelated to the industrial motor vehicle accident of 
March 15, 1993. 
The applicant responds to the carriers denial, indicating 
that the opinion of Dr. S. Knorpp should not be admissable, due to 
procedural concerns, and because Dr. Knorpp never examined him. 
The applicant states that, in October of 1994, the carrier actually 
arranged for him to see a physician of its choice, Dr. J. Yelton, 
in Indiana, where he now resides. Dr. Yelton examined him and 
reviewed his treatment and progress since the date of injury. Dr. 
Yelton specifies in his report to the carrier that the treatment 
that the applicant had been receiving since July of 1994 was 
reasonable and was related to the March 15, 1993 industrial 
accident. The applicant argues that the carrier was not happy with 
the conclusions of Dr. Yelton, its own chosen physician, and sought 
out another opinion from Dr. Knorpp, just prior to the hearing. 
The applicant argues that the Industrial Commission rules do not 
allow the carrier to obtain an unlimited number of different 
medical opinions in an attempt to find one that will support its 
position that no further treatment or benefits are reasonable. The 
applicant argues that the carrier chose its physician for offering 
a second opinion when it requested him to see Dr. Yelton and that 
the carrier should be required to abide by Dr. Yelton's 
recommendations, rather than the after-acquired opinion of Dr. 
Knorpp. The applicant argues that Dr. Knorpp's opinion should also 
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be dismissed, because it is not properly founded. The applicant 
points out that Dr. Knorpp merely reviewed his medical records and 
did no phyisical examination of him. The applicant argues that Dr. 
Knorpp cannot offer a reliable opinion about what treatment is, or 
is not, warranted, without examining him to see what his condition 
is. 
The carrier argued at hearing that it is now clear, based 
on the opinions of the treating physician, Dr. Yelton and Dr. 
Knorpp, that there is a significant medical controversy regarding 
the relatedness and the medical necessity of the treatment and time 
off work since July 1994 and that, as a result, the ALJ should 
refer the dispute to a medical panel for additional input on this 
contested issue. The carrier indicated at hearing that it would 
have preferred to have the applicant examined by Dr. Knorpp, rather 
than have Dr. Knorpp merely do a file review, but cost containment 
concerns prevented it from paying to have the applicant come to 
Utah for such an examination. The carrier argued that the carrier 
itself did not choose Dr. Yelton for the initial second-opinion 
evaluation and that this choice was made by an third pary 
vocational rehabilitation firm, Intracorp, that had been hired by 
the carrier. The carrier argued at hearing that Intracorp did a 
poor selection in choosing Dr. Yelton to perform the second-opinion 
evaluation, as Dr. Yelton turns out to have the same philosophy 
regarding extended treatment as does the applicant's treating 
physician. Based on Dr. Knorpp's preferred opinion, the carrier 
has denied additional temporary total compensation beginning in 
July of 1994, has denied payment on all prescription medication 
except anti-depressants (amitrytilline), has denied payment on 
physical therapy offered beginning in July of 1994, has denied 
payment for diagnostic studies including a head CT, a brain MRI, an 
EEG, EMG/nerve conduction velocity testing, and sleep studies, all 
accomplished after July of 1994, and has denied payment for all but 
3 series of trigger point injections begun in August of 1994. 
Updated medical records were received post-hearing, on March 
22, 1995, and the matter was considered ready for order at that 
time. 
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FINDINGS OF FACT: 
The applicant was hired by Stampede Trucking to work as a 
long-haul semi-truck driver in July of 1992. The applicant 
apparently concedes that the prior compensation rate paid to him by 
the carrier ($167.00/week) is accurately computed based on his 
average weekly wage while employed by Stampede Trucking. Per 
stipulation of the attorneys at hearing, the facts regarding his 
March 15, 1993 industrial motor vehicle accident are accurately 
reflected in a transcript of the recorded statement that the 
applicant gave to the carrier on December 6, 1994. That statement 
indicates that the applicant was proceeding through an intersection 
in Florida on March 15, 1993 when he was broadsided by a Suburban 
pulling a 30-foot trailor. The Suburban struck his vehicle at the 
rear axels of his tractor. The applicant indicates in his 
statement that he was wearing a seat belt at the time, without a 
shoulder harness. As a result of being struck by the Suburban, the 
applicant recalls having his head snapped around to the left and he 
recalls slamming his left knee into the the window crank. Per the 
recorded statement, the applicant was just 10 miles away from the 
site where he was to deliver his load when the accident occurred. 
After the accident, the applicant found that his vehicle was 
driveable, but only at about 25 miles per hour. He drove the 
vehicle to the delivery site and then had another driver who had 
been following him give him a ride to the emergency room. 
Per the medical records admitted at hearing (Exhibit D-l), 
the applicant was seen at the Mid-Florida Health Center emergency 
room in Haines City, Florida, on the same day as the accident, with 
complaints of low back pain, upper back pain and neck pain. X-rays 
were taken of the cervical spine and the left knee. The cervical 
spine X-ray was read to show mild chronic changes at C6, with 
minimal lipping and the left knee X-ray was read as normal. The 
diagnostic impression is listed as cervical strain and left knee 
strain and the applicant was advised to follow-up with a doctor as 
soon as possible, when he got back home to Indiana. The applicant 
did not immediately return to Indiana at that time, but instead 
stayed in Florida at a motel, while his semi-truck tractor was 
being repaired. Per the recorded statement, the applicant just 
laid in bed at the motel for the next 10 days or so, until the 
truck was ready to drive. When it was repaired, he drove it back 
to Indiana, but the applicant stated that it took him 4 days to 
make the 900-mile trip, because he was able to drive only 1 to 1% 
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hours at a time. The applicant stated his driving limitation was 
due to pain at the base of his neck, at the top of his shoulder, 
between his shoulder blades and in the left knee. 
When the applicant got back to Indiana, he was seen at the 
Medical Center of Vincennes, in Vincennes, Indiana, on March 28, 
1993, apparently by a Dr. Hedde. The handwritten office note for 
this visit indicates that the applicant was complaining of pain 
between the shoulder blades, in the neck and in the left knee. Some 
aching and popping in the neck is noted and the office note 
reflects that the applicant was having problems with lifting 
things. A cervical muscle strain and left knee strain were 
diagnosed and the applicant was prescribed robaxin (muscle relaxer) 
and darvocet (pain medication). Dr. Hedde followed up with the 
applicant on April 6, 1993 and noted that the applicant did not 
feel much better. At that time, he referred the applicant on to an 
orthopedist, Dr. T. Fenwick of the Vincennes Orthopedic Surgery 
Clinic. Thereafter, Dr. Hedde apparently did refill the 
applicant's darvocet prescription several times. 
The applicant fist saw Dr. Fenwick on April 8, 1993. Dr. 
Fenwick noted left knee symptoms and a prior arthroscopic 
menisectomy in 1986. With respect to the neck and upper back, he 
noted cervical spine pain at the base of the neck, with popping and 
limitation of range of motion, as well as pain between the shoulder 
blades. He diagnosed myofacial strain of the neck and upper back 
with a left knee contusion causing a traumatic chondromalacia 
lesion. He referred the applicant for physical therapy to the neck 
and upper back and for knee exercises. He also took the applicant 
off work and prescribed darvocet and tylenol. The applicant had 8 
physical therapy treatments in April, apparently consisting of 
passive modalities (apparently primarily ultrasound) with no relief 
to the cervical and thoracic spine. Due to continued symptoms in 
the left knee, Dr. Fenwick referred the applicant to Good Samaritan 
Hospital in Vincennes on April 27, 1993 for an MRI of the left 
knee. This was read to show no evidence of a meniscal tear, but 
some thinning of the articular cartilage of the patella. 
During May of 1993, the applicant saw Dr. Fenwick twice (on 
May 13, 1993 and on May 20, 1993) and got 11 physical therapy 
treatments. The physical therapy apparently still consisted of 
passive modality treatment and little if any improvement was noted. 
Dr. Fenwick decided that it was going to take some time for the 
applicant to heal and felt that he needed to be in "real good 
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shape" to return to his truck driving, as it required the applicant 
to work with heavy tarps. He therefore had the applicant continue 
with physical therapy and did not see the applicant again until 
July 8, 1993. The applicant got 14 physical therapy treatments in 
June of 1993 and 9 treatments in July of 1993. The physical 
therapy notes reflect up and down ' improvement of the applicant7s 
symptoms, but no real lasting steady improvement. Nonetheless, 
when Dr. Fenwick saw the applicant on July 8, 1993, Dr. Fenwick 
noted that he thought that the applicants neck was much better. 
Pain between the shoulder blades was noted to still exist, but with 
improvement. Some left knee symptoms remained and Dr. Fenwick 
decided to have the exercise weights boosted to assist with this. 
Dr. Fenwick noted that it was his impression that the physical 
therapy was really helping. On July 13, 1993, Dr. Fenwick wrote 
the carrier and indicated that he thought that the applicant was 
much improved, that his residual neck soreness was expected to 
improve within the next 2 weeks and that he anticipted a release to 
return to work around that time. Dr. Fenwick released the 
applicant to return to work on July 22, 1993 and indicated that the 
applicant should return for follow-up in 6 weeks. 
The carrier paid for all of Dr. Fenwick7s 1993 treatment and 
for the applicant7s time off work from March through July of 1993. 
The applicant did return to his same job with Stampede Trucking in 
late July of 1993. However, the applicant indicates in his 
recorded statement that he did not feel that Dr. Fenwick 7s 
treatment or the physical therapy improved his condition. He 
indicates in that statement that he requested to be released to 
return to work, but still had constant pain in his neck and upper 
back, along with headaches, when he returned to work in late July 
or early August of 1993. He recalls that Dr. Fenwick advised him 
not to work on flatbed trailors (apparently due to load maintenance 
responsibilities on these trailors) and advised him not to lift 
over 50 pounds on a permanent basis. As a result, the applicant 
states that he drove only tanker trailors when he returned to work. 
He stated that he actually performed truck driving with Stampede, 
or leased to another company, through April 15, 1994, when he quit 
driving truck, because of a wage dispute with Stampede and because 
of back pain and headaches. 
The applicant did follow-up with Dr. Fenwick in October of 
1993, and at that time, Dr. Fenwick noted continued symptoms in the 
knee, at the base of the neck and between the shoulder blades, all 
of which he felt were aggravated by long hours driving truck. 
Nevertheless, Dr. Fenwick notes that, at that time, he felt the 
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applicant had reached maximum medical improvement. Also in October 
1993, the applicant began seeing Dr. J. Rohrer, D.O. for a sinus 
infection and accompanying headaches. X-rays of the sinuses and a 
CT of the head done at Good Samaritan Hospital, in October of 1993, 
at Dr. Rohrer's referral, were read as unremarkable. Dr. Rohrer 
tried a number of medications to treat the infection, including 
beconase and prednisone. He also prescribed darvocet, apparently 
for the headaches. In late October of 1993, he referred the 
applicant to Dr. Bizal, at the Tri-State Otolaryngology clinic in 
Evansville, Indiana. Dr. Bizal noted that the applicant smoked and 
had a high caffeine intake. He recommended decreased smoking and 
caffeine intake, both of which he felt might be contributing to the 
development of migraine headaches and sinusitis. From November of 
1993 through early July of 1994, Dr. Rohrer was the applicant's 
only treating physician, per the medical record exhibit. During 
this period of time, it is unclear how often Dr. Rohrer actually 
saw the applicant. His records reflect regular prescription 
refills, for the most part for hismanal (apparently an anti-
histimine), beconase AQ and darvocet. 
As noted above, the applicant quit truck driving in April 
of 1994 and started working as a sales representative for home 
cleaning system. This job required transporting and demonstrating 
equipment weighing around 30 pounds. The applicant did this 
through July of 1994, although he began seeing Dr. Fenwick again in 
mid-July of 1994. At that time, Dr. Fenwick noted that the 
applicant had recurrence of neck and lower cervical problems, along 
with pain in between the shoulder blades, the same as when Dr. 
Fenwick first saw the applicant in April of 1993. Dr. Fenwick 
notes that the applicant indicated that he never got completely 
well previously. Dr. Fenwick referred the applicant back to 
physical therapy, for hot packs and ultrasound treatment, 
anticpating following up with the applicant in 3 weeks. The 
applicant got 5 treatments in between July 11, 1994 and July 22, 
1994, with no improvement noted by the therapist. On July 22, 
1994, the applicant called Dr. Fenwick's office complaining of a 
severe headache. He was prescribed darvocet, toradol and flexeril 
at that time and was also advised to call Dr. Rohrer7s office. The 
applicant did call Dr. Rohrer's office and Dr. Rohrer added imetrix 
to the prescribed medications. Later that day, the applicant was 
seen at the Good Samaritan Hospital ER for his headache. The ER 
note indicates that the applicant had been having headaches for one 
year and that other symptoms included alot of tension and sinus 
headaches. It was noted that the applicant had taken 6 darvocet, 
1 imetrix and had gone to physical therapy for hot packs and 
ultrasound that day, but still had the severe headache. The 
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applicant was treated with IV compazine, nubain and stadol and was 
improved upon release, per the ER records. The applicant's 
recorded statement reflects that this trip to the ER is what caused 
him to discontinue working as a door-to-door sales representative. 
When the applicant saw Dr. Fenwick again on July 25, 1994, 
Dr. Fenwick noted the ER visit and opined that the applicant's 
muscular tension headaches might be related to his back and upper 
shoulder pain. He decided to continue with the physical therapy 
modalities and noted that he anticipated a referral for trigger 
point injection therapy if the physical therapy did not improve the 
applicant's condition. In his recorded statement, the applicant 
indicates that the headaches that he was having in July of 1994 
were not the same kind of headaches that Dr. Rohrer was treating 
beginning in late 1993. The statement indicates that the headaches 
that Dr. Rohrer was treating were sinus headaches located in his 
face around his nose. He states that this was not the location of 
the headaches that he was having when he began to see Dr. Fenwick 
again. The applicant did have several more physical therapy 
treatments in late July and early August 1994 and then Dr. Fenwich 
referred the applicant to Good Samaritan Hospital for treatment at 
the Pain Clinic by Dr. E. Humphreys. He also referred the 
applicant to Dr. H. Matick, D. 0., apparently for additional 
diagnostic work. 
The applicant was first seen at the Pain Clinic by Dr. 
Humphreys on August 2, 1994. On that date, Dr. Humphreys noted 
frontal occipital headaches and severe neck and shoulder pain. It 
is noted that the applicant could not tolerate driving or lifting 
and had to quit his sales job, because even minor lifting and 
turning of his head and shoulders caused intolerable pain. It is 
noted that even laying down did not help his symptoms at that 
point, with darvocet and toradol making the pain barely tolerable. 
It is also noted that the applicant had not had any active physical 
therapy to that point. The conclusion was that the applicant had 
significant myofacial syndrome and that trigger point injections 
might ameliorate a large majority of the symptoms. The injections 
offered on that date (trigger point injections to the lower neck 
and upper back and bilateral greater occipital nerve blocks) 
apparently resulted in at least initial significant pain reduction. 
Dr. Humphreys also refilled the applciant's toradol and darvocet on 
that day. The injections were repeated one week later, on August 
9, 1994, with an indication in the record that the symptoms were 
less bothersome after the first set of injections. When Dr. 
Fenwick saw the applicant in follow-up on August 11, 1994, he noted 
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that it was his impression that the injections were helping the 
headaches, reducing their severity and that he would continue the 
applicant's off-work status for another 6 weeks while the applicant 
continued with the injections. 
On August 15, 1994, the applicant saw Dr. H. Matick, D. 0., 
who apparently specializes in neurological diagnostic work. Dr. 
Matick's August 15, 1994 letter to Dr. Fenwick indicates that he 
wanted to rule out an intracranial mass as a cause of the headaches 
and wanted to rule out a herniated cervical disc as well. Dr. 
Matick therefore referred the applicant for an MRI of the brain, an 
MRI of the cervical spine, EMG studies of the upper extremities, 
sleep studies (SSEPs) and he prescribed elavil (an anti-
depressant) . The applicant had his third set of trigger point 
injections and greater occipital nerve blocks on August 16, 1994. 
It was noted that the applicant had received 2-3 days of benefit 
after the last injections. The medical records reflect that the 
results of the diagnostic work recommended by Dr. Matick, D.O. were 
as follows: August 17, 1994 EEG done by Dr. Matick was read as 
normal, EMG studies done at Good Samaritan Hospital on August 22, 
1994 were read as normal for both upper extremities and SSEP 
studies done that same day at the hospital resulted in a reading 
that was compatible with mild peripheral neuropathy affecting both 
upper extremities, MRI of the brain and MRI of the cervical spine 
done on August 23, 1994 at Good Samaritan Hospital were both read 
as unremarkable. 
The applicant had has fourth, fifth, sixth and seventh set 
of trigger point injections and greater occipital nerve blocks at 
Good Samaritan Hospital on August 23, 1994, August 31, 1994, 
September 7, 1994 and September 14, 1994. After all of these 
injections, it was noted that the applicant's overall pain relief 
was at 20%, with some mild improvement in the headaches, but with 
no significant improvement in the neck and upper back pain. Most 
of the notes documenting the injections indicate that Dr. Humphreys 
felt that the injections were not intended to cure the applicant of 
all his pain symptoms and that this was not to be expected. The 
applicant saw Dr. Fenwick again on September 15, 1994 and he 
indicated that the applicant was to remain off work for another 6 
weeks, continuing with the injections. Dr. Matick's letter to Dr. 
Fenwick, dated September 20, 1994, indicates that he simply 
recommended continued medications, with an increase in the elavil 
dosage, continued flexeril, an increase in darvocet usage and a 
decrease in the toradol. After the applicant's eighth set of 
trigger point injections and greater occipital nerve blocks on 
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September 21, 1994, Dr. Humphreys noted that there was a 30-35% 
overall improvement and he noted that he anticipated eventually 
trying the applicant in a work hardening program. 
At some point, the carrier apparently sought out the 
services of Intracorp/ a private vocational rehabilitation firm 
with offices all over the country. Apparently, Intracorp was 
requested to assist in the oversight of the applicant's treatment 
so as to manage and assist in returning the applicant to work. A 
September 25, 1994 report of Intracorp indicates that it was the 
impression of the case worker that the trigger point injections 
that the applicant was receiving were not providing any relief at 
all. The report indicates that it was the intention of the case 
worker to send the medical information to a Dr. Yelton for his 
review and that the applicant was to be scheduled for an 
examination by Dr. Yelton. The applicant did have an examination 
performed by Dr. Yelton on October 5, 1994, after he received 2 
additional series of trigger point injections on September 28, 1994 
and October 5, 1994. After these injections, it was noted that the 
applicant felt that he was having less frequent (only once or twice 
per week) and less severe headaches and was 30-40% improved. 
Dr. Yelton's October 5, 1994 report summarizes the 
applicant's industrial accident and injuries and the treatment and 
diagnostic work that he had had to date. In his report, Dr. Yelton 
concludes that the applicant had chronic cervical and 
scapulothoracic strain. He noted that the applicant's headaches 
were consistent with this diagnosis and were a result of chronic 
muscle tightness in the cervical muscles. Dr. Yelton explains that 
this explains why the headaches had a delayed onset. With respect 
to the treatment that the applicant was having at that time 
(including the trigger point injections, muscle relaxants and 
elavil) Dr. Yelton found these to be appropriate and he recommended 
continuance of the treatment. He noted that he also recommended 
adding heat and massage and stretching/strengthening exercises. He 
noted that he felt a slow recovery should be anticipated and he 
found that the applicant had not yet reached maximum medical 
improvement and thus was not yet ready for a permanent impairment 
rating. 
The applicant continued with his weekly trigger point 
injections and greater occipital nerve blocks. He had his eleventh 
through his fourteenth set of injections on October 12, 1994, 
October 19, 1994, October 26, 1994 and November 2, 1994. Per the 
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accompanying pain clinic notes of Dr. Humphreys, the applicant 
remained at 30-40% overall improved after these injections. Dr. 
Humphreys also noted that it was safe to say that the applicant 
would not be able to ever return to heavy work, but that it was 
unclear if he would be released to return to some kind of 
functional employment at some point. 
On November 3, 1994, Dr. Yelton wrote the carrier apparently 
responding to some questions that the carrier had with respect to 
his conclusions. . He reiterates in this letter that he felt that 
the applicant's headaches were not related to his sinus condition 
and were related to chronic cervical and scapulothoracic strain. 
He reiterated that a "delayed presentation" for the headaches was 
not inconsistent. He restated his conclusion that the pain clinic 
referral and treatment was appropriate for chronic pain syndrome, 
which diagnosis he found was common in association with chronic 
cervical/scapulothoracic strain. He states in his letter that he 
felt that the frequency of the trigger point injections should be 
at the discretion of the treating physician. Apparently in 
response to a question regarding the lack of objective physical 
findings in the diagnostic studies obtained by Dr. Matick, Dr. 
Yelton responds that the lack of objective findings and failure to 
confirm radiculopathy, per the MRI, CT and neurological testing, 
did not rule out problems of a muscular nature in the neck and 
upper back, which he found was the source of the applicant's pain. 
The applicant saw Dr. Fenwick again on November 7, 1994 for 
follow-up and he kept the applicant off work, recommended continued 
injection therapy and referred the applicant to Good Samaritan 
Hospital for a functional capacity evaluation (FCE). The FCE was 
done on November 8, 1994 and notes that the applicant described his 
pain level to be a 10 out of a possible 10. It notes that the 
applicant had gained 30 pounds since the date of injury and that he 
was under a 10-pound lifting restriction, per the applicant. The 
conclusion of the evaluator was simply that it was recommended that 
the applicant undergo a therapeutic and conditioning program with 
specified work hardening goals to be achieved in 4 weeks. 
The applicant got 8 additional series of trigger point 
injections and greater occipital nerve blocks on November 9, 1994, 
November 1'6, 1994, December 14, 1994, December 21, 1994, December 
29, 1994, January 4, 1995, February 8, 1995 and February 23, 1995. 
On December 8, 1994, when the applicant saw Dr. Fenwick for the 
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last time, Dr. Fenwick noted that he felt that the applicant did 
not need to continue seeing him and that Dr. Humphreys at the pain 
clinic could manage his care at that point. Notes accompanying the 
pain clinic treatment indicate up and down improvement and 
worsening of both the headaches and neck/upper back pain, depending 
on the weather and some aggravation caused by the physical therapy 
that was apparently begun again in November of 1994 (no actual 
records for this reinstituted therapy are included in the medical 
record exhibit). The pain clinic notes indicate that the applicant 
continued to need "opioids" to manage his pain, in addition to the 
injections. After the eighteenth in the series of injections, on 
December 21, 1994, Dr. Humphreys noted that the applicant was 
approaching a plateau. Dr. Humphreys experimented with adding 
dexamethasone and prednisone to the injection therapy in late 
December and early January and with a cervical epidural in February 
of 1995. He switched from a weekly regimen to a bi-weekly regimen 
in February 1995. The last pain clinic note is dated February 23, 
1995 and indicates that the applicant had taken some time off 
physical therapy and was returning to it at that time. Dr. 
Humphreys noted at that time that he still did not see a very 
favorable prognosis for the applicant's longterm problems 
associated with the myofascial pain and greater occiptial 
neuralgia. 
Just prior to the hearing in this case, the carrier 
requested Dr. S. Knorpp to review the applicant's medical records 
and respond to some questions that the carrier had with respect to 
the medical treatment and time off work that the applicant had been 
having in 1994. Dr. Knorrp's report is dated March 3, 1995 and was 
made available to the applicant and his attorney just several days 
before the March 7, 1995 hearing. In his report, Dr. Knorpp 
reviews the records that were made available to him. The listing 
of the records referred to Dr. Knorpp does appear to be fairly 
complete. Dr. Knorpp indicates that he understood that the 
applicant was able to complete his delivery on the date of accident 
and that no traumatic related pathology was indentified at the 
hospital on that date. He notes that he understood that the 
applicant had returned to work from July of 1993 through April of 
1994, during which time he was not required to "provide heavy 
manual materials handling." 
Dr. Knorpp emphasizes in his report that the applicant's 
headache treatment was initially related to sinusitis in October of 
1993 and that the muscle tension headaches that have been diagnosed 
more recently are not unusual in any given individual. Asva 
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result, he states that there is no reason to relate them to the 
motor vehicle accident that took place 16 months before. With 
respect to the diagnostic studies ordered by Dr. Matick, he notes 
that most of these were duplicative and unnecessary. He states 
that the EEG was unnecessary as there was no history of seizures of 
any type. . The MRIs, the SSEP study and the EMG were medically 
unwarranted, per Dr. Knorpp, as there were no symptoms being 
manifested to warrant these diagnostic studies. The MRI of the 
cervical spine alone was possibly warranted to rule out a herniated 
cervical disc, per Dr. Knorpp. With respect to the injections, Dr. 
Knorrp concludes that use of therapeutic injections for chronic 
myofacial pain can be reasonable, if used judiciously (i.e. 
intermittently for pain exacerbation not amenable to other 
treatment) if the individual receiving the injections experiences 
significant and substantial, prolonged benefit from the therapy. 
Dr. Humphrey's use of more than 3 series of injections, where no 
significant lasting improvement was noted, was palliative and 
promoted treatment dependency, per Dr. Knorpp. 
With respect to the period of time off work in 1994 and 
1995, Dr. Knorpp states that there was no need to consider the 
applicant disabled during this period of time based solely on his 
subjective symptomatology. He noted that the November 8, 1994 
functional capacity evaluation did not provide enough information 
on which to base a finding of disability and he noted that the 
evaluator simply restated that he understood that the applicant was 
already under a doctor imposed lifting restriction of no more than 
10 pounds. Dr. Knorpp's recommendations for the applicant were as 
follows: quit smoking, stop injection therapy, start 
aerobic/cardiovascular conditioning, see a doctor experienced in 
chronic pain management (one who recommends maximizing use of anti-
depressants) , quit narcotic, muscle relaxant and anti-inflammatory 
therapy as it has no proven benefit for long-term control of 
myofacial type pain and can be habit forming, get vocational 
rehabilitaion and have a formal functional capacity evaluation to 
objectify his safe work capacities. With respect to the 
applicant's headaches, Dr. Knorpp concluded that there were multi-
factorial in origin, with the cervicothoracic muscle strain 
suffered at the time of the industrial motor vehicle accident being 
a portion of the origin. Nonetheless, Dr. Knorpp states that 
persistent cervicothoracic pain, with or without headaches, is not 
disabling. 
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW: 
The ALJ declines to refer this case to a medical panel and 
finds that the report of Dr. Knorpp is not admissable for the 
purpose of establishing a medical controversy regarding the 
treatment regimen and time off work beginning in July of 1994. The 
problems with Dr. Knorpp7s report relate to the procedures followed 
by the carrier in obtaining the report. The procedural problems 
with the report that the ALJ is most concerned with are: 1) the 
failure of Dr. Knorpp to examine the applicant and 2) the fact that 
the report was obtained after the carrier had already obtained one 
second opinion from another physician, who did examine the 
applicant, but whose opinion was not favorable to the carrier. 
Failure to examine the applicant: 
The ALJ feels that the failure to examine the applicant 
creates foundational problems with Dr. Knorpp's conclusions, 
especially considering the fact that all other physicians involved 
in this matter, who offered different opinions from that of Dr. 
Knorrp, did examine the applicant. As noted at hearing, it may be 
that examining the applicant is not always necessary in order for 
the physician to offer a well-founded medical opinion on a 
contested issue. On certain medical issues, examination results 
may be irrelevant. This is sometimes the case with simple 
causation questions. If the question is merely what event 
preciptated the development of a condition or caused an injury to 
occur, the present medical condition of the applicant may be 
irrelevant. However, when the contested issue deals with the 
appropriate treatment advisable, the present medical condition of 
the applicant would seem to be extremely relevant. 
In this case, the appropriate treatment for the applicants 
condition is the main contested issue. Dr. Knorpp concedes some 
treatment related to the 1993 industrial motor vehicle accident is 
still warranted, he just feels that a different treatment regimen 
than what has been recommended by Dr. Humphreys and Dr. Yelton 
should be followed. However, without examining the applicant, the 
ALJ cannot see how Dr. Knorpp can offer a well-founded opinion 
regarding what treatment is warranted, or not warranted. Certainly 
the well-accepted standard in the medical field is that examination 
of the patient is a pre-requisite to recommending appropriate 
medical care. In addition, with respect to second medical opinions 
ORDER 
RE: JOHN R. KIMBALL 
PAGE 15 
sought by the carrier, the ALJ should note that the Commission rule 
(R5#8-l-4 (H)) states that the carrier/employer is entitled to an 
"independent medical examination11 (emphasis added) • This suggests 
that one medical report sought by the carrier and based on an 
examination should be admitted. The Commission rules do not 
address reports based on medical record reviews conducted by 
physicians. As a result, the ALJ sees no inference of 
admissability for these reports in the rules, and it would 
logically follow that these reports should be admissable at the 
discretion of the ALJ, depending on their reliability and their 
relevance to the issue to be decided. Based on the foundational 
concerns noted above, the ALJ declines to admit Dr. Knorpp's record 
review report for purpose of establishing a medical controversy 
regarding the appropriate treatment regimen for the applicant. 
Additional second opinions obtained bv the carrier: 
As noted above, the Industrial Commission rules (in 
particular R5$8-l-4 (H)) allow the carrier the opportunity to have 
the applicant examined by a physician of its choice. The rule 
specifically indicates the right to one second opinion examination. 
The rule was undoubtedly promulgated with recognition that 
differing opinions within the medical community regarding 
causation, advisable treatment and other issues are not uncommon. 
If the second opinion obtained by the employer/carrier conflicts 
with the applicant's treating physician's opinion, then the matter 
is generally sent to a medical panel by the ALJ for additional 
medical input. This process allows for indentification of a 
medical controversy and resolution of that controversy by the ALT 
after obtaining sufficient medical expert advice. The process is 
generally viewed as a fair and reasonable means of resolving 
medical controversy on contested issues, but the process does add 
considerably to the period of time that the parties spend in 
litigation. Although the Commission has interpreted the rule 
liberally to allow the employer/carrier to obtain additional second 
opinions when new issues arise over the course of managing a claim 
on a given industrial accident, in order to prevent the necessity 
of sending every medical issue on every case to a medical panel and 
thereby increasing the number of cases involving lengthy, complex 
litigation, the Commission has not allowed the carrier/employer 
more than one second opinion on a given issue. 
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If the Commission were to allow for more than one second 
opinion on a given issue, the next question would be, if two were 
allowed, why not three or four. In essence, this would allow the 
carrier/employer to keep getting additional medical opinions until 
it -got one that supported the least-costly alternative for the 
employer/carrier, forcing the applicant to go through Commission 
litigation and a medical panel referral in every case where the 
carrier did not like the opinion of the treating physician on a 
given issue. The ALJ finds that interpreting the Commission rule 
this liberally creates unnecessarily lengthy litigation heavily 
weighted in favor of the party that can afford to keep getting 
additional medical opinions. Considering the undesirable 
consequenecs that would follow, the ALJ can see no reason why the 
Commission rule should be interpreted this liberally. The ALJ 
finds that it is more logical and fair to limit the 
employer/carrier to one second opinion evaluation on any one given 
major medical issue. This allows for each party to offer an 
opinion supportive of its posiiton, without providing one party 
with an unfair advantage over the other. 
The instant case is illustrative of a situation where the 
carrier was seeking a medical opinion that provided for a less-
costly means of managing the applicants claim. When the initial 
second opinion of Dr. Yelton was not supportive of a less-costly 
regimen of treatment, the carrier sought out a third opinion. The 
carrier's cost-containment concerns in this case are further 
emphasized by the carrier's reluctance to pay travel expenses for 
the applicant to come to Utah for the third-opinion examination. 
Although the ALJ can understand that the carrier has cost-
containment concerns, the Commission cannot be in the position of 
interpreting its procedural rules to assist one party in addressing 
its- concerns (i.e. by admitting an unlimited number of medical 
opinion reports, even if they are not well-founded) while ignoring 
the concerns of the opposing party. The carrier also noted at 
hearing that it had many problems trying to manage the applicant's 
claim, as he resides outside of Utah, and the carrier noted regrets 
in hiring Intracorp to oversee the applicant's treatment regimen, 
as in retrospect, Intracorp chose a physician that ended up merely 
agreeing with the treating physician's lengthy and costly treatment 
regimen. Once again, the Commission cannot take the carrier's case 
managment problems into account in deciding how it should interpet 
the litigation procedure rules in any given case. The most fair 
way to interpret the Commission rule regarding employer/carrier 
sought second opinions is to allow just one second opinion 
examination at a time. 
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Based on the foregoing discussion, the ALJ feels she must 
refuse to admit the opinion of Dr. Knorpp, as poorly founded and 
improperly obtained per Commission rule. Based on the opinions of 
Dr. Humphreys and Dr. Yelton, it appears that the treatment regimen 
offered at least through the end of 1994 was reasonably medically 
necessary as a result of the industrial accident of March 15, 1993. 
Dr. Fenwick and Dr. Humphreys appear to indicate that the applicant 
remained medically unstable at least through the end of 1994 and 
thus the ALJ will award medical expenses and temporary total 
compensation (TTC) through December 31, 1994. The medical record 
exhibit has very little medical information for 1995, but the ALJ 
notes that, by February of 1995, Dr. Humphreys was spacing out the 
injections more and was indicating his feeling that he did not 
anticipate the applicant improving significantly in the future. It 
appears therefore that the applicant was approaching medical 
stability at that point. The ALJ will not try to pick a point of 
medical stability after of January 1, 1995, because of the minimal 
information for 1995 that the ALJ has before her. The ALJ hopes 
that the parties will be able to come to an agreement on a date of 
medical stability in 1995. If an agreement cannot be reached, 
updated medical information can be submitted and the ALJ will 
reopen the matter for consideration of the medical stability issue. 
At this point, the ALJ will simply award benefits through December 
31, 1994 and leave the period thereafter to be settled by the 
parties or litigated in the future, if necessary. 
ORDER: 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the defendants, Stampede 
Trucking, Inc./Workers Compensation Fund of Utah, pay the 
applicant, John R. Kimball, temporary total compensation at the 
rate of $167.00 per week, for 23.286 weeks, or $3,888.76, for the 
period of medical instability associated with the March 15, 1993 
industrial accident, from July 22, 1994 through December 31, 1994. 
That amount is accrued and due and payable in a lump sum, plus 
interest at 8% per annum, per U.C.A. 35-1-78, and less the attorney 
fees to be awarded below. 
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the defendants, Stampede Trucking, 
Inc./Workers Compensation Fund of Utah, pay all medical expenses 
incurred as the result of the March 15, 1993 industrial accident, 
including the expenses incurred for the treatment offered during 
the period of July 22, 1994 through December 31, 1994; said 
expenses to be paid in accordance with the medical and surgical fee 
sqhedule of the Industrial Commission of Utah. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the defendants, Stampede Trucking, 
Inc./Workers Compensation Fund of Utah, pay T. Jeffery Cottle, 
attorney for the applicant, the sum of $777.75, plus 20% of the 
interest payable on the award, per Commission rule R568-1-7, for 
services.rendered in this matter, the same to be deducted from the 
aforesaid award to the applicant, and to be remitted directly to 
the office of T. Jeffery Cottle. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Motion for Review of the 
foregoing shall be filed in writing within thirty (30) days of the 
date hereof, specifying in detail the particular errors and 
objections, and, unless so filed, this Order shall be final and not 
subject tQ review or appeal. In the event a Motion for Review is 
timely filed, the parties shall have fifteen (15) days from the 
date of filing with the Commission, in which to file a written 
response with the Commission in accordance with Section 63-46b-
12(2) Utah Code Annotated. 
DATED this(^/ day of April, 1995. 
Barbara Elicerio 
Administrative Law Judge 
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John R. Kimball 
107 Navaho Drive 
Vincennes, IN 47591 
T. Jeffery Cottle 
Attorney at Law 
387 West Center Street 
Orem, UT 84058 
Carrie Taylor 
Attorney at Law 
Workers Compensation Fund of Utah 
P 0 Box 57929 
SLC, UT 84157-0929 
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JOHN R. KIMBALL, * '*" Ls#Q 
Applicant, * ORDER DENYING REQUEST 
* FOR RECONSIDERATION 
vs. * 
STAMPEDE TRUCKING and WORKERS * 
COMPENSATION FUND OF UTAH, * Case No. 94-0967 
Defendants. * 
Stampede Trucking and The Workers Compensation Fund of Utah 
(referred to jointly as "Stampede") ask The Industrial Commission of 
Utah to reconsider its prior decision affirming the Administrative 
Law Judge's award of benefits to John R. Kimball pursuant to the 
Utah Workers1 Compensation Act. 
The Industrial Commission exercises jurisdiction over this 
request for reconsideration pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-13 
and Utah Admin. Code R568-1-4.0. 
PACKQROTOD 
In its prior decision, the Industrial Commission concluded that 
a medical report, prepared by Dr. Knorpp and proffered by Stampede 
as evidence in the hearing before the ALJ, was inadmissable. The 
Industrial Commission further concluded that Stampede had failed to 
demonstrate the existence of a significant medical issue which would 
warrant referral of Mr. Kimball's claim to a medical panel. The 
Industrial Commission therefore affirmed the ALJ's order directing 
Stampede to pay workers' compensation benefits to Mr. Kimball. 
ISSUES UNDER RECONSIDERATION 
Stampede insists the Industrial Commission erred in excluding 
Dr. Knorpp's report from evidence. Stampede further argues that if 
Dr. Knorpp's report is admitted into evidence, the report 
establishes a significant medical issue which must be referred to a 
medical panel under the Industrial Commission's Rule R568-1-9. 
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DISCISSION 
In its prior decision, the Industrial Commission concluded Dr. 
Knorpp's report was inadmissable because Stampede failed to submit 
the report at least one week prior to the hearing, as required by 
the Industrial Commission's Rule 568-1-4.J. 
Stampede concedes that Dr. Knorpp's report was not submitted in 
conformity with the Rule R568-1-4.J. In fact, the report was not 
submitted to opposing counsel until the evening before the hearing. 
The report was not submitted to the ALJ until the time of the 
hearing. 
In an attempt to justify its failure to comply with Rule R568-
1-4.J., Stampede argues it is customary to violate the rule. 
However, Stampede offers no support for this assertion. The 
Industrial Commission recognizes that under appropriate 
circumstances, the requirements of the rule may be relaxed by 
agreement of the parties and approval of the ALJ. No circumstances 
justifying Stampede's violation of Rule R568-1-4.J. are present in 
this case. 
Stampede also argues that §35-1-108 (1) (B) (1) of the Workers' 
Compensation Act requires that Dr. Knorpp's report be accepted as 
evidence. However, §35-1-108(1) (B) (1) governs what is commonly 
referred to as "managed health care" . It does not govern the time 
period for submitting medical evidence in contested cases. 
Finally, Stampede contends the Industrial Commission's Rule 
R568-1-9 requires that Mr. Kimball's claim be referred to a medical 
panel. Rule R568-1-9 provides in material part as follows: 
A. A panel will be utilized . . . where: 
1. One or more significant medical issues may be 
involved. Generally, a significant medical issue must be 
shown by conflicting medical reports. Significant medical 
issues are involved when there are: 
(c) Medical expenses in controversy amounting to more than 
$2,000. 
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In this case, Stampede has failed to properly submit evidence 
of a significant medical issue. Consequently, the rule does not 
require referral of this case to a medical panel. In reaching this 
conclusion, the Industrial Commission is mindful of the Utah Supreme 
Court's recent decision in Willardson v. Industrial Commission et 
al. However, this case is distinguished from Willardson by the lack 
of any evidence in the record establishing a medical controversy. 
It is not the Industrial Commission's purpose to administer 
Rule R568-1-4.J. in an unduly harsh manner. However, the efficient 
and fair adjudication of workers' compensation claims requires that 
the parties follow certain rules. Such rules are simple and few in 
number, but they are important nonetheless. Stampede was well aware 
of the rule in question. 
ORDER 
The Industrial Commission reaffirms its prior decision in this 
matter and denies Stampede's request for reconsideration. It is so 
ordered. 
Dated this t> day of November, 1995. 
Thomas R. Carlson 
Commissioner 
IMPORTANT! NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS FOLLOWS ON NEXT PAGE. 
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IMPORTANT! NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS FOLLOWS ON NEXT PAGE. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 
Any party may appeal this order to the Utah Court of Appeals by 
filing a petition for review with that court within 30 days of the 
date of this order. 
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I certify that a copy of the foregoing Order Denying 
Reconsideration in the matter of John R. Kimball, Case No. 94-0967, 
was mailed first class postage prepaid this 11> day of November, 
1995, to the following: 
;JOHN R. KIMBALL 
107 NAVAHO DRIVE 
VINCENNES, IN 47591 
T. JEFFERY COTTLE 
387 WEST CENTER STREET 
OREM, UTAH 84057 
CARRIE T. TAYLOR 
392 EAST 6400 SOUTH 
P O BOX 57929 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84157-0929 
--u Olson 
Support Specialist 
Industrial Commission of Utah 
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November 14,1994 
Marjorie Mele, Clerk 
Legal Division 
Industrial Commission of Utah 
160 East 300 South 
Salt Lake City, UT 84151-0910 
RE: Claimant: 
File No.: 
Inj Date: 
Employer 
Case No.: 
Dear Ms. Mele: 
John R. Kimball 
93-17987 
3-15-93 
Stampede Truck! 
94-967 
Our office is in receipt of Application for Hearing filed by T. Jeffery Cottle, Attorney, for the above 
named Applicant 
On March 15, 1993, the Workers Compensation Fund of Utah was the workers' compensation 
carrier for Stampede Inc. To date the following benefits have been paid on this claim: temporary total 
disability from March 16, 1993 through July 22, 1993 at a rate of $167.00 per week for a total of 
$3,077.57, medical benefits totaling $3,396.63 and rehabilitation benefits totaling $926.86. 
Defendants respond to the allegations contained in Application for Hearing as follows: 
1. Admit the allegations contained in paragraph 1. 
2. Admit the allegations contained in paragraph 2. 
3. Admit the allegations contained in paragraph 3. 
4. Deny the allegations contained in paragraph 4. Defendants admit that the injury caused time 
off from March 16, 1993 through July 22,1993. 
5. Deny the allegations contained in paragraph 5. 
6. Admit the allegations contained in paragraph 6 and note that the wage and hour information on 
the Application was left blank. 
Following the Applicant's accident, he was diagnosed as suffering from myofacial strain of the neck 
and upper back and contusion of the left knee. He received over 40 physical therapy treatments from April 
14,1993 through July 21,1993. The Applicant was released to return to work on July 23,1993 by his 
treating physician, Terry D. Fenwick, M.D. On October 4,1993 the Applicant was declared medically 
stable and no follow-up appointments were made. 
392 East 6400 South Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 Phone (801) 288-8000 
Marjorie Mele, Clerk 
Hearing Coordinator 
Division of Industrial Accidents 
Industrial Commission of Utah 
RE: John R. Kimball 
November 14,1994 
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After reaching maximum medical improvement, the Applicant retained a third-party attorney to 
pursue the driver of the vehicle which caused his auto accident Following retention of this third-party 
attorney, in July, 1994, the Applicant incurred over $10,000.00 of additional medical expenses which he 
alleges are related to his industrial injury. These expenses were not authorized by the Defendants. 
Defendants1 position is that the recent surge of medical care was sought by the Applicant in an 
effort to increase his special damages in his third-party action. The medical evidence will show that the 
vast majority of the medical services provided were not medically necessary and unreasonable. 
Defendants intend to have each of the individual charges reviewed to determine which, if any, are 
related to the industrial injury and are reasonable and necessary. Defendants are also currently in the 
process of clarifying an independent medical evaluation opinion performed in the Applicant's home state 
of Indiana. Due to the distance between Utah and Indiana this claim has been very difficult to administer 
and manage. 
Defendants reserve the right to supplement this answer as needed. Please find enclosed a list of 
the medical expenses which the Applicant has incurred since July 11,1994. 
Please contact me if you need any additional information. 
Respectfully, 
WORKERS COMPENSATION FUND OF UTAH 
Carrie T. Taylor 
Attorney at Law 
288-8061 
CTT:if 
cc: T. Jeffery Cottle, 387 W Center, Orem, UT 84057 
Stampede Trucking, 1159 N 7900 E, Huntsville, UT 84317 
Tina Kleinschmitt 
JOHN R. KIMBALL 
UNPAID MEDICAL BILLS 
DAIE PROVIDER 
07/11/94 VINCENNES ORTHO. 
SERVICE AMOUNT 
OFFICE VISIT, P.T. $ 129.00 
CERVICAL TRACTION UNIT 
07/14/94 
07/15/94 
07/17/94 
07/18/94 
07/20/94 
07/22/94 
07/23/94 
07/25/94 
07/27/94 
07/28/94 
07/29/94 
08/01/94 
08/02/94 
VINCENNES ORTHO. 
VINCENNES ORTHO. 
WALGRENS 
VINCENNES ORTHO. 
VINCENNES ORTHO. 
P.T. 
P.T. 
PROPOXY-N/ACET 
P.T. 
P.T. 
GOOD SAMARITAN E.D. VISIT/CT SCAN 
VINCENNES RADIOLOGY 
VINCENNES ORTHO. P.T. 
WALGREENS IMnREXKTT 
WALGREENS 
VINCENNES ORTHO. 
WALGREENS 
VINCENNES ORTHO. 
VINCENNES ORTHO. 
VINCENNES ORTHO. 
VINCENNES ORTHO. 
GOOD SAMARITAN 
ANESTHESIA ASSOC. 
WALGREENS 
PROPOXY-N/ACET 
OFFICE visrr, P.T. 
TORADOL 
CYCLOBENZAPRINE 
PROPOXY-N/ACET 
P.T. 
OFFICE VISIT 
P.T. 
P.T. 
INJECTION 
PROPOXY-N/ACET 
TORADOL 
$ 
S 
$ 
$ 
$ 
52.00 
58.00 
7.49 
52.00 
52.00 
$ 827.03 
$ 88.85 
$ 52.00 
$ 70.99 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
6.39 
94.00 
36.19 
24.99 
7.49 
52.00 
42.00 
52.00 
52.00 
$ 129.50 
$ 360.00 
$ 9.69 
$ 114.19 
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DATE 
08/09/94 
08/11/94 
08/15/94 
08/16/94 
08/17/94 
08/18/94 
08/22/94 
08/23/94 
08/25/94 
08/31/94 
09/01/94 
09/07/94 
09/14/94 
09/15/94 
09/20/94 
PROVIDER 
GOOD SAMARITAN 
ANESTHESIA ASSOC. 
WALGREENS 
VINCENNES ORTHO. 
HENRY J. MATICK, D.O. 
WALGREENS 
GOOD SAMARITAN 
ANESTHESIA ASSOC. 
HENRY J. MATICK, D.O. 
WALGREENS 
GOOD SAMARITAN 
HENRY J. MATICK, D.O. 
GOOD SAMARITAN 
ANESTHESIA ASSOC. 
VINCENNES ORTHO. 
GOOD SAMARITAN 
ANESTHESIA ASSOC. 
WALGREENS 
GOOD SAMARITAN 
ANESTHESIA ASSOC. 
GOOD SAMARITAN 
VINCENNES ORTHO. 
HENRY J. MATICK, D.O 
WALGREENS 
SERVICE 
INJECTION 
CYCLOBENZAPRJNE 
OFFICE VISIT 
AMURIPTYLINE 
INJECTION 
TORADOL 
PROPOXY-N/ACET 
EMG 
INJECTION 
;MRI-CSPINE, BRAIN 
NARRATIVE REPORT 
INJECTION 
PROPOXY-N/ACET 
TREATMENT ROOM 
INJECTION 
OFFICE VISIT 
AMURIPTYLINE 
AMOUNT 
$ 155.52 
$ 480.00 
$ 50.39 
$ 42.00 
$ 185.00 
$ 4.39 
$ 147.23 
$ 480.00 
$ 225.00 
$ 114.19 
$ 9.69 
$ 407.00 
$ 705.00 
$ 144.50 
$3085.00 
$ 280.00 
$ 35.00 
$ 165.52 
$ 280.00 
$ 15.19 
$ 50.00 
$ 80.00 
$ 133.02 
$ 42.00 
$ 45.00 
$ 4.59 
2 
DATE 
09/21/94 
09/28/94 
10/03/94 
10/05/94 
10/12/94 
10/15/94 
10/26/94 
10/27/94 
PROVIDER 
GOOD SAMARITAN 
WALGREENS 
GOOD SAMARITAN 
WALGREENS 
WELBORN CLINIC 
GOOD SAMARITAN 
WALGREENS 
WALGREENS 
VINCENNES ORTHO. 
GRAND TOTAL 
SERVICE 
INJECTION 
PROPOXY-N/CET 
INJECTION 
PROPOXY-N/ACET 
SECOND OPINION 
INJECTION 
PROPOXY-N/ACET 
AMTTRIPTYLINE 
PROPOXY-N/ACET. 
OFFICE VISIT 
AMOUNT 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$1 
147.23 
15.19 
134.50 
15.19 
168.20 
150.52 
15.19 
4.59 
15.19 
42.00 
0.442.83 
EXPENSES INCURRED OVER 15 WEEKS, 4 DAYS, FROM 7/11/94 - 10/27/94 
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1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
P R O C E E D I N G S 
THE COURT: This is Case No. 94967, John 
Kimball vs. Stampede Trucking and the Workers 
Compensation Fund of Utah. Mr. Kimball is present 
today and represented by Jeffery Cottle, Attorney, and 
the Workers Compensation Fund is represented by Carrie 
Taylor, Attorney. The Administrative Law Judge is 
Barbara Elicerio. I've got a medical record exhibit 
that's been compiled by the Workers Compensation Fund. 
Mr. Cottle, have you had an opportunity to review that? 
MR. COTTLE: I got the final copy today, and I 
don't have any objection based upon my further 
review — I only got it five minutes ago -- based upon 
further review in the next couple of days. 
THE COURT: Okay. Let me know if there's any 
problems. otherwise, I'll just consider it admitted 
into evidence. I'm going to mark it as Exhibit Dl. 
Let's see, Ms. Taylor, does the answer reflect what's 
been paid on this claim, is that what's in there, is 
that correct? 
MS. TAYLOR: Yes. I believe so. 
THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Cottle, do you want to 
go over what additional benefits are being claimed? 
MR. COTTLE: Yes. We're claiming benefits. 
He was cut off in August of 1994, and we're claiming 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
benefits from 1994 until the present, and the medical 
benefits that I think Ms. Taylor has figured about 
$13,000.00, and there might be more on top of that. 
I'm sure there is, because he's continuing treatment 
for physical therapy and trigger point injections. 
THE COURT: And, Ms. Taylor, do you want to 
give the Fund's response to the claim? 
MS. TAYLOR: Yes, Your Honor. It's basically 
outlined in our Answer, but our position is that the 
expenses incurred by the Claimant have been 
unreasonable and not medically necessary. We're not 
disputing that there was an industrial accident or that 
he required care or time off work, we are disputing 
additional time off work that he will claim in '94 and 
all of the medical expenses that he has incurred after 
having been stabilized and returned to work. 
THE COURT: When was that? 
MS. TAYLOR: He was stabilized in 1993, July 
22, and -- I should say stabilized, Your Honor, he was 
released to return to work at that time, and his 
treating physician declared him an MMI in October of 
'93 without any impairment. He continued without any 
active treatment for over six months, probably more 
like eight months, and then went back in and starting 
treating again. 
THE COURT: So are you saying that it's — he 
just doesn't need any treatment, or it's not related to 
the industrial accident? 
MS. TAYLOR: We're saying that the treatment 
that he got was unreasonable, excessive, and to a 
certain extent it will probably touch upon causation, 
although I don't think we need to really get to the 
causal relationship. I think that a panel can consider 
the medical necessity issues. 
THE COURT: Do you have an opinion indicating 
the treatment was excessive? 
MS. TAYLOR: 
THE COURT: 
MS. TAYLOR: 
Yes. 
And that opinion is — 
I haven't submitted that yet, if 
you would like it now. 
THE COURT: 
MS. TAYLOR: 
copy yesterday. 
THE COURT: 
MS. TAYLOR: 
THE COURT: 
MS. TAYLOR: 
some other exhibits 
hopefully admitted. 
THE COURT: 
Oh, it's not in the exhibits? 
It's not. We just barely got our 
Oh, has Mr. Cottle seen it? 
Yeah. He was faxed a copy. 
Oh, okay. 
This is the opinion and here are 
that we'd like to have marked and 
Well, really I'll just let you 
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respond to the — 
MR. COTTLE: Yeah. I would like to make a 
short opening and I think that will put the case in 
perspective, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. COTTLE: My client, John Kimball, on — on 
3/15/93 was in Florida actually was making a delivery. 
He's a truck driver. 
THE COURT: Uh huh. 
MR. COTTLE: It was one day after the 
hurricane in 1993. He pulled up to a stop light, the 
stop light was out, which turned it into a four way 
stop. He actually let all the sides go and then 
proceeded through, and — and a car did not — did not 
yield and actually plowed into him just behind the 
driver's side going about fifty-five miles an hour 
through the truck from two to four feet and severely 
cranked his neck. As opposing Counsel has indicated, 
he was basically off work from then, March, until July 
when he was stabilized by his doctor, and I think it 
was Dr. Fenwick at that time. 
At that point, he went back to work, he tried 
to go back to work. He couldn't work the way that he 
was used to. You have to — You have to put Mr. 
Kimball's character in kind of a perspective here. He 
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spent six years in the Navy, he was actually -- I have 
here he was given several awards, including special 
warfare and special — and special forces in the seal 
teams down in California. He's kind of a man's man. 
So he goes back to work, can't work, continues to try 
to work, finally has to give up truck driving because 
he can't do that, takes a job as a vacuum cleaner 
salesman, couldn't even do that, gets back into 
treatment with Dr. Fenwick, and Dr. Fenwick puts him 
back into treatment and takes him off work. 
At that point, the Fund becomes concerned 
because we're talking about, like — like opposing 
Counsel said, six to eight months later, and so they're 
really concerned. So they — they retain Corvail 
Corporation, which is a nationwide company that they 
work with here in Utah, actually have an IME performed 
on Mr. Kimball. They don't — They send him about 
sixty-five miles to Evansville, which is a metropolitan 
area of over a hundred thousand people, and they have 
him see a Dr. Yeltin there, which is the first medical 
record in the medical records that you have there. 
THE COURT: Uh huh. 
MR. COTTLE: Dr. Yeltin at that point sees him 
in October and actually agrees with his treating 
physician and says that everything is fine up to that 
point, he should 
off work, 
fact, he 
although 
that hey, 
be getting the treatment, he 
he hasn't stabilized, and, in fact 
wouldn't even give him an impairment 
should 
— and, 
rating, 
he thought there was one. He said that — 
this guy isn't stable, I agree with 
diagnosis of his 
does not 
followup 
At that 
treating physicians. 
point, the 
start benefits, in 
letter saying hey, 
information, why 
rule against us? 
Workers Compensat 
fact, they write 1 
this is all the 
the 
ion Fund 
him a 
-- you know, why did you basically 
And, again, he writes back ' to them, 
be 
in 
again in the medical records, it says hey, this guy has 
a documented diagnosis, he's got problems, he deserves 
temporary total disability, but the Fund does not 
respond, they don't do anything, they don't pay him, 
they refuse to pay him, he has to retain me, I file an 
action. 
They have no medical basis whatsoever to deny 
benefits. Their own IME physician says pay, but they 
don't pay, and they don't do anything basically until I 
don't know, a couple of weeks ago they said heck, we've 
got a hearing coming up and we've got to get some 
evidence in our favor to combat it. They don't even 
get an IME, they get a file review, which I would like 
to present a recent case that we just litigated, myself 
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and opposing Counsel. 
On the Lee Fitzgerald case Judge Allen on page 
two indicates what he thought of a doctor against the 
file review. He says, "Counsel for the Applicant 
argued that since the Applicant's condition was not 
healed or stabilized until September 21st, 1993, the 
physical therapy received by the Applicant through 
February 20th, 1993 was reasonable and necessary as a 
result of the industrial. 
In reviewing the file I note that the treating 
physician, Dr. Clark, on August 17, 1993 has indicated 
that the Applicant was having a slow and satisfactory 
recovery from his lumbar dysectomy and fusion therapy. 
At that time, Dr. Clark recommended the Applicant 
continue physical therapy, which he did. 
By contrast, the Defendants rely on a brief 
medical report from Dr. Knorpp — I don't know how to 
say it, K-N-O-R-P-P. In reviewing that report, I note 
that Dr. Knorpp did not examine the Applicant. Rather, 
it would appear that Dr. Knorpp based his medical 
opinion, such as it is, on a mere file review and 
apparently did not see fit to examine the Applicant. 
Based upon the file review also, the doctor saw fit to 
conclude that the Applicant should have been able to 
engage in a home exercise program. 
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However, in view of the fact the \ doctor did 
not examine the Applicant, it seems unreasonable J 
the doctor to conclude that the Applicant 
for 
- should have 
been able to engage in a home exercise program." 
comparisoni 
physician, 
F it goes on to talk about the treating 
and here we are the same doctor giving 
same file review and all the sudden, 
it yesterday and they decide to base 
seven months, of their opinion. 
I 
that their 
up and has 
not to pay 
mean I'm wondering who at 
IME physician wasn't good 
a nationwide network, and 
you 
the 
the 
know, we 
By 
the 
get 
last what, 
Fund dec. 
that Corvail 
has 
benefits. And then basically 
Lded 
set 
just decided 
retroactive, 
they get a doctor to do a file review. 
I eight years I've been practicing before 
try to do apples and apples and oranges 
and when you have a treating physician 
physician who both have been seeing the 
I mean in the 
Commissions, we 
and oranges, 
and an IME 
Applicant, you 
know, giving an opinion based upon a file review, I 
mean if file reviews were so valuable, 
three or four reasons why file reviews 
good, and that's why 
the people. I think 
the medical panels 
I have a list of 
can -- are not 
see the -- see 
it's a very important aspect. 
Anyway, I should say that the 
attempt to say well, 
Fund did make an 
we don't have anything else, let's 
10 
hire a private investigator to follow him around for 
three days, and here's what they found, absolutely 
nothing. I'd like to submit that. Three days of a 
private investigator following my client. And again, 
there's absolutely nothing on it that shows him doing 
anything other than having his problem. 
And now, I mean based upon this late file 
review, they want it to go to a medical panel when 
their own IME physician says that the care — treatment 
is reasonable, the care is reasonable, he should be 
paid temporary total. We have the same doctor who the 
presiding Judge, Judge Allen -- I mean I think if we 
all did file reviews — I mean here's where I'm coming 
from. 
If a treating physician said that there wasn't 
causation for an industrial injury and the — and the 
Defendant was in my position and she got an IME 
physician to say yeah, it's not causally related, it's 
not reasonable, and then I go out against a treating 
physician and against my own — of the IME and get a 
file review, I think she would be laughing me out of 
court, you know. But no, she wants to come in and say 
this should go to a medical panel, and I'm saying I 
don't see it. I think we should compare apples to 
apples. 
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She knew this case was going to be litigated, 
she knew we were going to be here, it's been scheduled 
for four months. If she didn't want to get an IME, 
then — then I think — I think that the case can be 
decided on the evidence that we have, both through an 
IME and the treating physicians. And it's just not one 
treating physician, it's three different treating 
physicians. 
The other thing that I would just like to 
basically bring up, and I don't know if you want all 
this information, Your Honor, but basically the bottom 
line in what Dr. Knorpp is saying is that he doesn't 
believe that fiber — fibromyalgia is a -- a medical 
diagnosis. That's what the bottom line of his report 
is, he doesn't believe in it, okay. 
And I'd just like to submit a few things. Dr. 
Colledge is at least half the time the Medical Director 
of the Industrial Commission. He diagnosed one of my 
clients unbeknownst before he diagnosed her with 
fibromyalgia, and so I think it goes — he's — Dr. 
Knorpp is basically saying it's not a medical diagnosis 
where we have a very reputable doctor saying that it 
is. 
And, further, a permanent and total disability 
claim that I have that was executed by the Commission 
on 
to 
March 
hold 
them. 
1st 
THE 
of this 
COURT: 
year — 
Mr. Cottle, 
on to some of these. 
MR. 
THE 
MR. 
COTTLE: 
COURT: 
COTTLE: 
Okay. 
Because I'm 
Okay. 
I'm 
gett 
goii 
,ing 
rig 
a 
to 
pi. 
ask you 
Le of 
THE COURT: And I'm afraid I'm going to get 
them all mixed up. 
MR. COTTLE: Okay. 
THE COURT: And we'll go ahead and mark them 
as exhibits in just a second. I'll just let you finish 
your — your discussion first. 
MR. COTTLE: Yeah. The Fund was involved in 
this claim. The reason for permanent and total 
disability, signed off by Richard Sumsion and Judge 
Allen, were fibromyalgia. I mean I went through on a 
databank when I found out what was going on. There's a 
databank of forty-nine hits on fibromyalgia. Out of 
those forty-nine hits, there's one negative article 
about it, and the rest of them see that it's a real 
problem. 
I picked up a Cumulative Index Medicus on 
fibromyalgia, basically the same thing, and then I have 
by the Utah Arthritic Information by their Foundation 
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there's a whole chapter in a book on fibromyalgia, 
which basically says that it's close to arthritis, but 
certainly not connected, but it is a severe disease, 
and I think it's totally recognized by the medical 
community. 
And I think that the Fund needed — needed 
some evidence to make a case today, and they got it on 
a file review, and it really is sad considering this 
evidence that Dr. Knorpp doesn't even believe in 
fibromyalgia, and that's basically what he's saying. 
And so based upon everything that I've said, I think 
that their position is that they want it to go to a 
medical panel, and I'm basically saying I think it's 
too little too late and doesn't even make sense, and I 
would ask that the Judge rule that the client has been 
getting treatment, the client feels likes he's getting 
better, the client hopefully will get back to work 
within the next few months, and — I mean the real — 
Here's the real bottom line though, is that we have a 
serious third party injury, he's retained an attorney 
who thinks that he's going to collect and the Fund will 
get every bit of their money back, so — I mean I don't 
understand — you know, I don't — I don't really 
understand the whole position. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
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MR. COTTLE: Thank you very much, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: You're welcome. Ms. Taylor, do 
you want to go ahead and respond then? 
MS. TAYLOR: Yeah. I would, although I don't 
want to be as long winded. Basically, we're dealing 
with a situation in which the Applicant was involved in 
an industrial injury. He sustained a neck injury in a 
motor vehicle accident. The accident occurred in 
Florida at 6:30 in the morning, he finished his run for 
the day, delivered his supplies, presented himself to 
the emergency room at 1:00 o'clock in the afternoon. 
He stayed for two weeks in Florida while his truck was 
being repaired. He then went home, he got active 
treatment at that time, we paid for four months 
physical therapy for this gentleman, a reasonable 
amount of therapy. He then — He was given his 
temporary total disability benefits, his doctor 
released him to work, gave him permanent restrictions, 
basically said you're medically stable, you're as good 
as you're going to get. 
Then in October he actually said the word MMI. 
Mr. Kimball continued on working as a truck driver, he 
had a dispute with his employer, which caused him to 
guit, he then went to work for — as a salesman 
demonstrating home cleaning systems that weighed thirty 
pounds. 
set them 
He'd 
up, ( 
having some -
testify 
we're go 
that ] 
take these cleaning 
demonstrate their use 
- some more symptoms. 
he had symptoms all a 
ing with this fibromyalgia 
a chronic pro 
year — 
When 
blem, he's going to a 
systems in' 
He then 
He'll — 
long, but 
diagnosis 
lways hurt 
he was taken off work a second 
almost a year and a half a 
got concerned as Mr. Cottle said. 
to homes, 
started 
He'll 
if ~ 
, he's 
. 
time, 
fter his injury, 
We hired Intraci 
if 
got 
a 
we 
orp, 
not Corvail, to try to help this gentleman. Intracorp 
had actually helped him before when he was off work and 
had facilitated getting him back to work for us. So we 
trusted them, we said okay let's go ahead and have you 
help us again. 
Intracorp, we relied on them to set up an IME 
with Dr. Yeltin. As it ended up, Dr. Yeltin is of the 
same practice philosophy as those people around him, 
that just because some doctors maybe still use leach 
therapy, we don't think that that's reasonable. We 
would have brought Mr. Kimball out for an IME, but it's 
very expensive, he lives in Indiana. 
We think that the practicing medical community 
here in Utah is a better judge of what we as a Utah 
company and Mr. Kimball as a Utah employee should have 
to pay for. 
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The file review was done specifically because 
it was going to be impractical to bring him out for an 
IME. If he's willing to stay for a couple of days, we 
can try to set up an IME, but I don't see anything in 
Dr. Knorpp's report that says he doesn't believe in 
fibromyalgia. What he says is based upon this person's 
condition, the treatment was excessive, wasn't related 
to his injury. We had sleep — I mean this is the type 
of treatment that's been performed, over a hundred 
injections in his neck, sleep studies, EMG's, you know, 
an MRI of his neck and his brain, and a CT scan of his 
brain. 
Mr. Kimball had a CT scan of his brain back in 
October because he was having some sinus problems, 
sinus headaches, and yet they repeated this study again 
in July. I mean if he had any trauma that was going to 
show up from his injury on a CT scan, it would have 
done so right after the injury, not a year and a half 
or more later. 
So our position is that the expenses that have 
been incurred are really unreasonable at this stage. 
Since Mr. Kimball has gone back and started treating 
again, he has incurred over $15,000.00 in medical 
bills. He does have a third party suit going on. Part 
of our position is that this is an effort to drive up 
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the special costs of that suit. His third party 
attorney has told him, and he'll probably testify that 
he was told that they couldn't settle the third party 
suit until everything that could be done had been done 
so that they could get him at some resolution. 
Well, if he's got fibromyalgia, this is a 
chronic ongoing problem. I — I — Here again, I don't 
see anything in Dr. Knorpp's evaluation that says he 
doesn't believe in fibromyalgia. What he says is that 
this gentleman needs trigger point injections, he 
should have three, and have it reevaluated to see if 
it's helping. That's not what happened here. He had 
over twenty different sessions or more, I mean well 
over a hundred different injections, and yet the 
symptoms remained at a plateau level. 
We try — I mean the whole goal of treatment 
is to get this gentleman back to work. He's not any 
closer to getting back to work now than he was back in 
July when they took him off of work, that the treatment 
hasn't been goal directed, hasn't been getting him 
anywhere. He's at the same place now as he was back 
then. 
As far as the information that Mr. Cottle 
brings up about the Fit2qerald case, I think it's 
interesting, because in Fitzgerald the file review that 
18 
was done by Dr. Knorpp there was done through First 
Health. They're a disability management company. And 
the file reviews that were done through our office, we 
would send them, I don't know, $30.00 to do a quick 
file review to give us an opinion about whether or not 
physical therapy was necessary, a very isolated, very 
narrow issue. 
In this case, the file review done by Dr. 
Knorpp was essentially an IME minus a physical 
examination, and if it had been financially practical 
to bring the Claimant out here and have him examined, 
we would have preferred that type of IME. But as a 
second choice and as an alternative, we had this file 
review, and it's very comprehensive, much more so than 
anything Dr. Yeltin or any of his treating physicians 
have ever done on him. 
They're not really aware of his past medical 
history, how exactly his symptom complexes evolved, and 
somebody who can take these records and evaluate them 
from beginning to end has a much broader perspective 
and scope of what's going on. 
Also, the fact that we put a P.I. on Mr. 
Kimball, I don't think that that's relevant at all. 
Our office oftentimes hires P.I.'s and it's on problem 
cases just like this where the medical costs are 
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skyrocketing, when we're no closer to getting the guy 
back to work as we were before. It's a legitimate 
thing to expend those kinds of costs. There's a lot of 
things that, you know, you can't catch in three days if 
you have somebody — We're not going to pay $10,000.00 
to try to save $10,000.00. It doesn't make any sense. 
So the fact that our P.I. went out and got 
some surveillance tape of the Claimant coming and going 
and doing his usual ordinary activities I don't think 
is relevant. What I do think is relevant is that prior 
to this Mr. Cottle and I had discussions, and I wasn't 
aware that the Claimant was coming out here I don't 
think until last week, so, you know, the fact that the 
file review — it takes some time to get records to the 
reviewing physician and to get reports back, so it 
wasn't that we just asked him to do it on the spur of 
the moment, it was that we didn't even think he was 
coming out, we thought this would be directed towards a 
medical panel. 
The bills involved in this case, like I say, 
are $15,000.00, which is well over the $2,000.00 mark 
that would warrant this being submitted to a medical 
panel. 
Here again, the bottom line that Mr. Cottle 
refers to as fibromyalgia is really irrelevant. The 
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diagnosis in this matter isn't what's at stake. What's 
at stake is the cost and whether or not the costs that 
were incurred were reasonable, medically necessary and 
related to his injury. 
You'll see from Mr. Kimball's testimony today 
he's had numerous injuries over years and years of his 
life, and whether that all contributed to his 
fibromyalgia or whether it came from this one single 
episode where he was involved in a motor vehicle 
accident, I don't know, and I don't think we need to 
decide that today. 
What we need to decide is whether it's 
reasonable for somebody to be treated appropriately, be 
given temporary total benefits, be released to return 
to work, to go back to work to demonstrate that he can 
do his work, then when he decides he's ready to get off 
work again, the doctors take him off work, if we should 
have to pay for an additional $15,000.00 in medical 
bills. That's what this boils down to. Fibromyalgia 
is irrelevant. If that's what he's got, that's fine, 
but the question is is what is reasonable treatment for 
that condition. 
THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. Like I say, 
we'll probably get to probably marking some of these 
exhibits, but let me just sort of summarize what I see 
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as the issue here. The first thing that we would need 
to — It seems like it's a medical — medical question 
basically, is his need for further treatment related to 
the industrial injury, and that's — correct me if I'm 
wrong — that's — that's basically what it comes down 
to, and whether that also involves inability to work or 
medically instability. 
And since it's a medical question, we have to 
rely on medical evidence to make — for me to make the 
decision as to whether or not he should have that 
additional treatment. And, typically, we have, you 
know, treating physicians that differ with IME doctors 
and then 
in this 
and they 
we send it to a medical panel. The difference 
case is that we've got several IME physicians 1 
differ in opinions, and the question is — I 
guess one question I have in my mind is how many IME 
opinions are you allowed. 
The rule I think — I couldn't quote the rule 
right now. But the rule I think indicates that one IME 
opinion 
specific 
the rule 
can be submitted, and I don't know if it's real 
, but I'm — at least that's the intention of 
Certainly, I wouldn't think it would allow 
for an unlimited number of IME's until you get the 
opinion 
whether 
that you want, and so I have some question 
or not I can use the second IME to create a 
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medical controversy to send it to a medical panel. 
That's the question I have in my mind. 
Another question is the nature of the second 
IME, the fact that there's been no examination. Now, I 
typically accept file reviews to create a medical 
controversy to send it to a medical panel in cases of 
medical causation questions, because if the doctor is 
just saying I'm reviewing all the treatment and all the 
problems they've had and I'm deciding whether that's 
related to the industrial accident based on the 
description of the accident, I don't see a real need 
for them to see the Applicant in those cases, because 
in those cases they're just making a causal analysis 
based on what were the symptoms, what was the accident, 
you know, what do I — do I think those are connected 
somehow, and I don't necessarily think that they have 
to see the Applicant in those cases. 
But when the question is whether they need 
treatment, then I really think they need to see the 
Applicant, because they have to see — they have to 
examine them to determine what problems they're having, 
and so I have less of a willingness to accept file 
reviews on that type of question. 
I understand the really difficult problems 
that arise in trying to manage a case that's out of 
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state, where the Applicant is out of state, and I don't 
know that — and it's difficult for — actually for 
both parties, because, you know, we also have 
Applicants that get cut off and just really don't have 
the money to come back for a hearing or whatever, and 
that creates problems, so it creates problems for both 
parties, and I — we try to work around that, but I 
don't think we can change the system completely just 
because of that situation. 
So, I guess the bottom line for me is I'm not 
sure if I would send it to a medical panel, I'm not 
sure that it meets the criteria for sending it to a 
medical panel, and my question is the second IME, 
whether, you know, I can use that. 
MS. TAYLOR: Your Honor, under Section 108 the 
Managed Healthcare Law that allows us to do certain 
cost containment measures, it allows us to do pure 
review, which is essentially what this boils down to is 
pure review, and I think it does put at issue the 
medical costs, and this is an issue of cost. And as I 
understand the rules, it says that if you've got more 
than $2,000.00 in controversy, whether you have 
supporting IME's or not, that that ought to be 
submitted to a panel. 
THE COURT: Well, I think what — 
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MR. COTTLE: But — But — But see, that 
allows — that allows an insurance carrier to get 
twenty IME's, like you say, until they get the one they 
want to go to a medical panel, which puts extreme 
hardship on him as — 
MS. TAYLOR: Well, but we haven't gotten 
twenty IME's, Your Honor. 
MR. COTTLE: — particularly, and what did you 
base the denial of medical benefits on for a seven 
month period? 
MS. TAYLOR: That — 
MR. COTTLE: You didn't have Dr. Knorpp's — 
MS. TAYLOR: No. We didn't, but we had an 
adjuster who is used to seeing how files are 
administered and how disability management takes place, 
and they knew something was awry, they got the 
opinion — 
MR. COTTLE: So — So an adjuster is now 
making — is now saying that your IME — 
MS. TAYLOR: Well, that's why it needs to go 
to a medical panel. I think the doctors need to 
decide. I don't think we should be the ones to mandate 
what we pay and what we don't pay without anything to 
back it up with. 
MR. COTTLE: I think that's ludicrous to say 
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that an adjuster can decide no, I'm not going to 
believe my IME and a treating physician, I'm going to 
decide not to pay benefits. 
MS. TAYLOR: It happens on a daily basis. 
MR. COTTLE: Well, it shouldn't happen I don't 
think. 
THE COURT: Well, you know, it does happen, 
and typically IME's are — are — are obtained well 
after, you know, the cutoff of benefits. It happens 
all the time, and that's not really a big issue for me. 
It may be a big issue for applicants, but as far as 
when it gets to the litigation stage, what I am 
concerned about is when I have conflicting IME's, which 
one do I — which one do I take, can I just take them 
all and say oh, we've got lots of opinions so we'll 
send it off to a medical panel. And, like I say, and 
when one of them is a treatment based decision without 
seeing the applicant, I have to ask if we've really 
established a medical controversy. 
MS. TAYLOR: In that case, if your decision is 
to not send it to a panel, what I would ask is that we 
keep the Applicant here and have him examined by Dr. 
Knorpp. I wouldn't be opposed to that, in fact, I 
encourage that. 
THE COURT: Well, we still run into the 
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problem, the other issue of you've already got one IME. 
MS. TAYLOR: That's true, and IME that was set 
up by an out of state provider, somebody we had no 
familiarity with, and somebody who, as luck would have 
it, has the same treatment philosophies as his treating 
physicians. 
THE COURT: Well, that's the luck of the draw 
I guess. 
MS. TAYLOR: That would not happen if he were 
in Utah. I don't think that would happen in Utah, and 
I think that we've been prejudiced enough by having to 
administer this claim with him in another state. I 
mean we've had to do all of this long distance, and the 
fact that we now finally have something to support our 
position, that, you know, we're going to be — said no, 
you can't bring that in because you didn't like what 
you got the first time? 
Well, the fact that we didn't like it the 
first time was because we had so little control over 
this Claimant, over this claim, over the treating 
physicians to communicate with them, that we had to 
rely on outside vendors who did not help us at all. In 
fact, when they initially were involved in the case, 
they sent us a letter saying, "Because of our 
involvement, we saved you $3,900.00." 
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Well, then when Mr. Kimball goes off work 
again and we get them involved again and then they send 
him to Dr. Yeltin, well now the Fund, guess what, we 
just cost you $15,000.00, because we happened to set 
you up with the wrong doctor to get the wrong opinion, 
and I think that the panel can flesh out these issues 
and pin down what's appropriate. I think if -- like I 
say, it's in Indiana, they could have some kind of 
quirks about treating fibromyalgia, but we won't ever 
know that unless we send it to a panel. 
THE COURT: Uh huh. 
MR. COTTLE: But — But you rely on physicians 
all the time, you rely on physicians of my clients that 
are living in California, in St. George. I mean 
normally when you get an IME you pay it, you know what 
I mean, and then if another controversy, you know, 
arises 
says, 
— 
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get another IME. 
MS. TAYLOR: No- What we need to do is win 
when the facts are right and the facts are straight, 
and the truth of the matter is Dr. Knorpp even said 
Workers Comp Fund you need to pay for the cervical MRI, 
because that can be directly attributed to his injury, 
that is something reasonable, and they said Workers 
Comp Fund you need to pay for at least three injections 
to see if they help this gentleman, and we're going 
okay, fine. Dr. Knorpp has not said here's — here's 
my opinion, we don't want you to pay for anything. 
What he said is based upon this gentleman's condition, 
these things are reasonable, you should pay for them. 
THE COURT: Okay. Let me just — And I don't 
want to cut you short, but, you know, if — if I don't 
send it to a medical panel, it's not that I'm not going 
to consider the evidence in front of me, it's just a 
question of whether or not I'm required to send it to a 
panel and whether — and I have some discretion there 
in determining — I guess interpreting the rule as to 
what a medical controversy is and whether that requires 
referral, and that's what I look — look for at the 
bottom line is not whether the carrier feels that over 
$2,000.00 expenses is at issue, that is, whether there 
is $2,000.00 expenses in medical controversy, in other 
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words, where the two physicians are saying I think he 
needs all this treatment and this other guy says I 
don't think he needs any of it, and it's over 
$2,000.00, then I would send it to a medical panel. 
But the question for me is, like I say, once 
again, I've got the conflicting IME's. I understand 
your problems with managing a case that's out of state, 
but I don't think that I can say well, since your — 
your — the Applicant is out of state you can get a 
number of IME's because of file management problems. 
I — I just — I don't know if I can say that. 
And I'll have to look at the rule again just 
to see what it says with respect to second opinions 
obtained by the insurance carrier and see if it allows 
for, you know, more than one, because otherwise I think 
it's just fundamentally unfair to say well, you can get 
as many as you want, or, you know, if you don't like 
the first one you can go ahead and get another one 
until you have one that says what you want it to say. 
And I understand you feel like, you know, 
Intracorp selected a bad physician and just sort of 
didn't do a good job, but unfortunately Intracorp was 
hired by you and you relied on their, I don't know, 
expertise or whatever in selecting a physician. You 
could have selected your own physician, you didn't have 
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to rely on Intracorp, nobody is making you rely on 
Intracorp, and so your choice to do so, if you have 
second thoughts about that later on, once again, I 
think that's sort of a file management problem that I 
don't think I can change the way we adjudicate claims 
here to accommodate, so — 
MS. TAYLOR: Your Honor, if I — if I can just 
point out that Dr. Yeltin, the IME physician, did his 
evaluation in early October and since that evaluation 
there has been numerous costs, well over $5,000.00 
additional incurred, and I don't think his opinion 
covers that period of time, where I think that Dr. 
Knorpp's opinion does. And if you don't want to call 
it an IME, I don't have any problem with that, but I 
think that the statute allows us to have two reviews 
for the purpose of cost containment. 
THE COURT: Well, that raises one question I 
have, is we're probably going to have to get sort of 
specific about what expenses we're talking about, 
which — what kind of treatment and how much is being 
claimed so I can, you know, even -- so if it goes to a 
medical panel they'll have that information, if it 
doesn't go to a medical panel I'll have that 
information. 
MR. COTTLE: I think she's prepared that. 
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MS. TAYLOR: That's the one that I submitted 
to you that I don't think we've marked yet, and those 
are just bills that have been sent to us. I don't know 
that this is all encompassing, there could be 
additional bills that haven't been added. 
THE COURT: Uh huh. 
MR. COTTLE: I don't know about opposing 
Counsel, but I think the crucial issue in this case is 
the medical panel, whether you're going to do it or 
not. 
THE COURT: Uh huh. 
MR. COTTLE: And, I mean if she wants to 
proffer some additional evidence, I can put my client 
on and basically we're going to cover the exact same 
things that you've already been made aware of or that 
you can find in the complete medical history that 
they've put together. I think if — if you — if you 
aren't go 
you'll go 
evidence. 
carefully 
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that the real issue is the medical panel. 
MS. TAYLOR: I think that that's what it boils 
down to. I'd like to have some independent physicians 
take a look at this, and I really think the fact that 
our IME only covered through October '94 we could say 
well, okay, we'll throw out anything prior to that, but 
then in controversy should be from October '94 forward, 
and the only opinion we have about that is Dr. 
Knorpp's. 
MR. COTTLE: Well, and several treating 
physicians, Dr. Humphrey's and Dr. Fenwick. 
MS. TAYLOR: Well, and the treating physicians 
who are getting paid, the more they do, the more they 
get paid. 
MR. COTTLE: Well, Dr. Knorpp has got a pretty 
penny for his little — 
MS. TAYLOR: I don't know. We haven't been 
billed yet. I'm waiting to see what the damage is. 
THE COURT: Yeah. Obviously, you've got 
biased doctors on both sides, there's no guestion about 
that. You know, when you come down to a guestion of 
not reasonably necessary, which I take it is your 
position, we presume that doctors providing the 
treatment think it's reasonably necessary, I mean 
that's just a presumption I have, so if they're 
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providing treatment, I will presume that they think 
it's reasonably necessary. 
Unless you can show me something that would 
indicate that they're purposely treating somebody that 
they know doesn't need the treatment, I'm going to 
presume that they think that they need the treatment, 
and so, you know, they don't necessarily have to have 
in writing somewhere, I think the treatment I'm giving 
him is necessary. 
So I think we have — you know, as long as we 
have a doctor saying it's not reasonably necessary, I 
think I've got a controversy, because I've got 
treatment going on and a doctor saying that it's not 
reasonably necessary, and we just keep getting back to 
the same issue as to what do you do with conflicting 
IME's and the question of what do you do with file 
reviews, does that constitute an IME? And IME is a 
medical examination, and I don't know what the rule 
says, and, once again, I'm going to have to look at the 
rule to see exactly what it says to see if there's some 
more guidance there, but I suspect it's rather vague 
and just says that you can get another medical opinion. 
MR. COTTLE: Well, my feeling is is if we 
could have been doing file reviews this whole time, Mr. 
Chai and Mr. Dyer and Mr. Kanell and IHC with Stuart 
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Weid and Dave McConkie, I mean I just don't think — 
I — I — I mean there's a number of reasons that, you 
know, whether history is valid, whether, you know, the 
current measurements are correct. 
I mean there's a lot of reasons and I think 
that that's why we have the Applicant seen 99.9 percent 
by the medical panel, and I think — I don't know if 
you were there, but when I went to — when I went to 
this training out at the Hilton — I think it was the 
Hilton out at — out at the airport, and they had 
those — those Fourth Edition AMA writers there, I mean 
they said that one of the most important or the most 
important thing with an IME or — is the examination to 
really find out, get a correct history, go over 
everything, get everything pinned down, get the 
measurements and really find out the circumstances. 
That's the most important part of the whole IME, and if 
they're not doing that, I mean I think it — I think 
it's a real fatal flaw. 
THE COURT: Yeah. 
MS. TAYLOR: Well, I think we need to — 
THE COURT: I don't know if I'd take Judge 
Allen's position and say that you can never use a file 
review. I — I differ a little bit from Judge Allen in 
the sense that I think maybe for medical causal 
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questions a file review is okay, because I just don't 
see how examining the Applicant — 
MR. COTTLE: No. I agree. 
THE COURT: — is going to change an opinion 
as to whether or not this is related to the accident 
that happened, although I do understand that if there's 
a controversy regarding the facts and what the 
Applicant is telling the doctor is different than what 
the records maybe reflect, that that raises an issue as 
to whether a file review is going to be an accurate --
MR. COTTLE: No. I agree with you. 
MS. TAYLOR: Well, and — 
THE COURT: But, you know, I — so I think 
they have very limited usage. I don't know if I could 
extend it and say I would accept them in all situations 
for purposes of creating a medical controversy in order 
to send it to a medical panel. Certainly, we could — 
MS. TAYLOR: I don't — And I don't think you 
should. 
THE COURT: You know, certainly we could send 
all cases to medical panels, just get these little 
details all cleared up, you know, and not have to deal 
with conflicting opinions, but, you know, we just have 
such a limited medical panel system and we also have 
rules that limit use of the medical panel, and I think 
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some hesitancy 
have to review 
' to send this to a panel, and I would 
the whole record before I make a final 
decision on that. So I'm not going to tell you today 
whether I'm going to do it or not, but I have some 
hesitancy in this case because of the things that I've 
indicated already. 
I do think we still need to get real specific 
about exactly what treatment is at issue, and I don't 
know if this list is going to be real helpful to me. I 
can make some sense out of some of it, but, Mr. Cottle, 
you were indicating that it was physical therapy and 
trigger point injections basically that's been at 
issue. Would you agree with that Ms. Taylor or is 
there something more that's at issue or — 
MS. TAYLOR: There's also been a number of 
diagnostic studies that have been done. 
THE COURT: Uh huh. Okay. 
3 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
MS. TAYLOR: And then medications as well. 
MR. COTTLE: And I think that — Yeah. That's 
about it. There are the medications too. I would 
agree with Ms. Taylor. 
THE COURT: Okay. Let's just, you know — 
Just a second. Let me just generally put this down. 
Trigger point injections, physical therapy, medications 
and diagnostic. Are you saying that all these things 
are contested by the Fund, everything on this list? 
MS. TAYLOR: No. In fact, having since 
reviewed Dr. Knorpp's evaluation, he seems to think 
that the cervical MRI is a reasonable thing to get, so 
I think we could just stipulate that we'll pay for the 
cervical MRI. 
THE COURT: Okay. Let's — I think that 
you're concerned with the number of trigger point 
injections, Ms. Taylor? 
MS. TAYLOR: Correct. 
THE COURT: Okay. And so how many would 
you — Is there a point that you would accept them 
to — to what point are you saying? 
MS. TAYLOR: Let me just take a look at Dr. 
Knorpp's report. 
MR. COTTLE: I think she told me 14 9. 
MS. TAYLOR: That's how many he's gotten? 
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MR. COTTLE: No. He's got 150 I think, so no, 
I'm just kidding. Didn't he say three and then it 
should be reviewed? 
MS. TAYLOR: What he says is that acute 
treatment for myofacial trigger point pain can and 
often does include judicious and intermittent use of 
trigger point therapeutic injections. The use of 
therapeutic injections for chronic myofacial pain is 
less well accepted, although arguably reasonable. So 
he's even saying trigger point injection is a valid 
treatment, even in chronic, although it's less 
accepted, not as many people agree with it. 
If judicially utilized in a individual who 
experienced significant and substantial and prolonged 
benefit, and the medical records and I also think that 
Claimant's testimony will indicate that that was not 
what happened in this case. Even in such cases, 
trigger point injection therapy would still be 
recommended on an intermittent basis and only for those 
exacerbations of pain not responsive to more 
conservative modalities. 
Dr. Humphrey's administration of well over a 
hundred therapeutic injections over more than fifteen 
treatment sessions is indefensible and follows no known 
or reasonably accepted medical standard of liberally 
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reasonable care for individuals with myofacial pain. 
THE COURT: Okay. Now, we've got past 
expenses and future ones probably at issue here as 
well, so you're contesting both the past and future, o 
you're willing to pay some of the past or — 
MS. TAYLOR: Any of the treatment that he 
received prior to being released to return to work, we 
have no problem paying for that, and, in fact, have 
already paid for that. 
THE COURT: Well, I've been presuming that al 
the treatment at -- this is beginning when he — 
MS. TAYLOR: In July of '93. 
THE COURT: In July of '93. So all of that 
after that you're contesting or — 
MS. TAYLOR: Or July of '94 actually. 
THE COURT: All the trigger point injections 
after that point you're contesting, some of them? 
MS. TAYLOR: Other than I think what — 
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THE COURT: Okay. And that's based on your 
feeling that they — they haven't been helpful; is that 
what you're saying? 
MS. TAYLOR: Based upon Dr. Knorpp's review 
that he said that medical necessity as to why such 
injection therapy was continued beyond the first three 
treatment sessions. He believes that anything after 
that was palliative and restorative in nature and 
didn't help the Claimant get any better, and based upon 
our review of the medical records, that seems to be the 
case as well. 
THE COURT: Okay. Mr. — 
MS. COTTLE: So if the client gets back to 
work in the next sixty days, you'll pay 
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MR. KIMBALL: Well, yeah. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. KIMBALL: They tend to help control the 
headaches. 
MR. COTTLE: I mean he tells me that they're 
trying to move them further apart and he really does 
hope that within the near future, you know, he will get 
back to a position where he could do some type of work, 
maybe not truck driving, because that is a lot of 
sitting. 
THE COURT: Uh huh. 
MS. TAYLOR: But, Your Honor, I'm sorry, the 
headaches are an issue in controversy as well, whether 
or not those are related to his injury. 
THE COURT: Okay. And do we have someone 
saying that — Is this Dr. Knorpp again? 
MS. TAYLOR: Well, in fact, his own treating 
physicians say well, it may be related, we don't know, 
we think it might. I mean no one that I know of has 
really pinned it down and said. He -- He went for, you 
know, a good — I'd say well over a year before anybody 
even thought his headaches might be related to that. 
He had quite a lot of treatment for sinus headaches, 
you know, several months after his injury. 
MR. COTTLE: But — But I think the medical 
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records indicate that they are different, and the IME 
physician definitely says to a specific answer to a 
question that they are related. 
THE COURT: Uh huh. 
MR. COTTLE: This is the one in October and 
November. 
THE COURT: Uh huh. Because up to this point 
I've been looking at not reasonably medically 
necessary. Now, if we have a medical causal, you know, 
is it related or not related, that's a little bit 
different than not reasonably medically necessary. 
MS. TAYLOR: And I — we didn't really ask Dr. 
Knorpp to address medical causation. What he puts in 
his report is that his headaches are probably a 
multi-factorial problem; he's a smoker, had numerous 
injuries, he did have this motor vehicle accident, it's 
probably a combination of everything combined. But why 
they presented themselves over a year after his injury, 
I don't think that question has really been — Yes. 
It's been addressed by Dr. Yeltin, but his own treating 
physicians I don't think have actually pinned it down. 
THE COURT: That's just something I'm going to 
review the records and see if we've really got, you 
know, if we've got a definitive analysis or if we've 
got just sort of they don't know, they're treating it 
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along with everything else. 
MR. COTTLE: I think — I think you'll find 
that there is a definitive analysis when you read the 
full medical report. 
THE COURT: Okay. Is there specific oral 
medication that you're concerned with? 
MS. TAYLOR: Uh huh. 
THE COURT: And — And what medication exactly 
are you — you don't feel is — 
MS. TAYLOR: Everything but I think the 
antitriptelene was what Dr. Knorpp had some concerns 
with. 
MR. COTTLE: The muscle relaxers and — 
MS. TAYLOR: And the narcotics and the 
anti-inflammatories. He's indicated in page 11 of 
his report that he would recommend termination of 
| narcotics, muscle re 
anti-inflammatories, 
of any proven medica 
myofacial pain. 
THE COURT: 
willing to pay for, 
MS. TAYLOR: 
laxants and non-steroidal 
because these 
1 benefit for 
Any physical 
or is that all 
We paid for 
'93, and so any of the additional 
think is necessary. 
i medications are 
long term control 
therapy that you' 
forty-two visits 
therapy we don't 
not 
of 
d be 
in 
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THE COURT: Was that after July of '93? 
MS. TAYLOR: After July of '94. 
THE COURT: Oh, in '94 you paid for physical 
therapy? 
MS. TAYLOR: In '93 we paid for forty-two 
sessions of therapy and — 
THE COURT: After July of '93? 
MS. TAYLOR: No. It was between his date of 
injury and the end of July. 
THE COURT: Okay. So I'm presuming every — 
the only things that we have at issue are after July of 
'93, so are you denying all of the physical therapy 
after July of '93, or he didn't get any after July 
of — no, he's got — 
MS. TAYLOR: He got about ten or eleven 
sessions. 
THE COURT: You feel — You feel that you 
wouldn't pay for any of the physical therapy after July 
of '93; is that — 
MS. TAYLOR: Right. 
THE COURT: Okay. Okay. And the diagnostic 
studies that you're denying are? 
MS. TAYLOR: There was a head CT, brain MRI, 
an EEG, an EMG and nerve conduction studies, and a 
CE — or SEC — SEP study, which is like the sleep 
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study. 
THE COURT: Okay. Okay. If it goes to a 
medical panel, I'll just be asking them about those 
things. If it doesn't go to a medical panel, what I'll 
be doing is looking at the medical evidence that exists 
and determining whether or not the preponderance of the 
evidence supports these things as being reasonably and 
medically necessary or not. Let's see, let me go ahead 
and mark this since we've been using it. And I'll mark 
this as D2 then. 
MS. TAYLOR: And which one is that now? 
THE COURT: That's the list of — of 
treatment. 
MS. TAYLOR: Okay. 
THE COURT: Let's see now, I've got some other 
stuff here. We'll mark stuff and then we'll — Now, 
the — I'm not sure what to do with 
report. I think maybe I'm going to 
separately, because it's sort of at 
it's not something that you're both 
being admitted along with the other 
take it. 
MR. COTTLE: That's fine. 
object to that. 
Dr. Knorpp's 
mark that 
issue beyond the --
stipulating to as 
medical records I 
Yes. I wouldn't 
THE COURT: So I'm going to mark it separately 
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so that I can refer to it separately, and I'm going to 
mark it as D3 then. 
MS. TAYLOR: Your Honor, if we need to, we can 
probably call him on the phone or have him come down 
and lay a little more foundation. 
THE COURT: Dr. Knorpp? 
MS. TAYLOR: Uh huh. 
THE COURT: Well, if you want to use — 
MS. TAYLOR: I mean I'd hate to have it not 
admitted. I think it's relevant. 
THE COURT: No. I'm just admitting separately 
is what I'm saying. 
MS. TAYLOR: Okay. 
THE COURT: I'm admitting it as a separate 
exhibit and not putting it — 
MS. TAYLOR: From the medical record? 
THE COURT: Right. 
MS. TAYLOR: Okay. 
THE COURT: Because I don't want to consider 
it as a joint medical record submission, because it's 
being contested by Mr. Cottle, and so I just want to 
mark it separately so I can refer to it separately. 
Now, I don't know if we're going to do 
testimony or not, and that's something we need to 
discuss. Let's see, I've got some other things. As 
4 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
far as — You had a bunch of exhibits on myofacial — 
MR. COTTLE: I — I think as long as you 
consider — consider those, I can — I can give them to 
you if you want to clutter up your file. 
THE COURT: Yeah. 
MS. TAYLOR: I mean I think we could stipulate 
that that's his diagnosis. I don't — I don't think 
that's a problem. 
THE COURT: I'm reluctant to accept those kind 
of things. 
MR. COTTLE: Okay. 
THE COURT: I'm certainly not going to read 
them. Sometimes I will give them to the medical panel 
and say if you want to read these you can read these, 
if you don't want to read them — 
MR. COTTLE: No. I understand. 
THE COURT: But, you know, I don't think they 
usually read them to tell you the honest truth, because 
I think — 
MR. COTTLE: They're far — They're far 
advanced than the basic things like this. 
THE COURT: Okay. Okay. We won't deal with 
those. I will mark Judge Allen's order, although I 
don't always do what Judge Allen does. 
MR. COTTLE: I understand that, and that's 
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certainly your prerogative• 
THE COURT: Don't tell him though. I'll mark 
that as Al. Okay. Okay. That's all of those. Now, 
this separate thing on Intracorp, is that — that's not 
in the medical record exhibit? 
MS. TAYLOR: No. Those are just our records. 
THE COURT: And they're a rehabilitation firm; 
isn't that correct? 
MS. TAYLOR: Correct. 
THE COURT: Okay. I'll go ahead and mark that 
as D4; is that what I'm up to I think? Yeah. Okay. 
Let's see, did you have anything else, Mr. Cottle? You 
had the video? 
MR. COTTLE: The only thing that I might have, 
but you don't have to take it in — I mean, the 
thing — I think that the Workers Compensation Fund 
probably own internal study is that they smoke out 
people that are really fraudulent within three days, 
and if — and if I had somebody following me for three 
days unknown, I mean I'd hate to see what I might have 
done, you know, and so I mean I understand opposing 
Counsel that it isn't relevant, but I think that it is, 
that, in fact, I mean for three days he had a private 
investigator on him, I mean he had just — I think — I 
don't even know if he had retained me yet, I'd have to 
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look at my records. 
But he basically wasn't doing anything, he was 
basically showing the world that he was temporary 
totally disabled. I mean he didn't even close the 
hood — They have him — They have him opening and 
closing the hood of his car, which he didn't do. I 
mean someone — he had some problems with his — with 
his truck, and he didn't even open and close his car, 
he had someone else — the hood of his car, so they 
really — I mean — I mean I guess opposing Counsel 
could say maybe psychosomatic, but hey, this is a 
person that is not putting on any airs, if you know 
what I mean. 
MS. TAYLOR: Well, we're — we're not 
disputing his condition. 
MR. 
MS. 
our evidence 
COTTLE: 
TAYLOR: 
I mean 
by Mr. Cottle, he doe 
any foundation for th 
Yeah. 
And I wou 
that wasn 
sn't have 
at. I don 
ldn't object that that's 
't procured or paid for 
a P.I. here to establish 
' t even know what 
days it was that he observed him. The adjuster 
arranged for 
MR. 
MS. 
file came up 
that, I 
COTTLE: 
TAYLOR: 
to me. 
did not. 
November 7th, 8th and 9th. 
It was arranged for before 
three 
the 
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MR. COTTLE: That's fine, Your Honor. I 
just -- you know, you have the record. 
MS. TAYLOR: So, you know, I think he can 
testify about his activities and the tape is 
irrelevant. 
THE COURT: Okay. Unless you insist, Mr. 
Cottle, I'm not going to take that then. 
MR. COTTLE: That's fine. 
THE COURT: Now, you have given me the 
recorded statement. 
MS. TAYLOR: Yes. 
MR. COTTLE: I have no objection. 
THE COURT: Is there something relevant in the 
recorded statement? 
MS. TAYLOR: I think it is, Your Honor, in 
that the file review that Dr. Knorpp did included all 
the medical records plus a review of the statement, and 
the history that is obtained from the patient is 
important because what his providers rely on is just a 
subjective history from him as well, and so I think it 
is relevant to pin down. 
THE COURT: Now, do we have whoever took this 
statement? 
MS. TAYLOR: I did. 
THE COURT: You took the statement? 
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MS. TAYLOR: Uh huh. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MS. TAYLOR: It hasn't been signed by the 
Applicant, but Mr. Cottle participated in the statement 
as well. 
THE COURT: Uh huh. 
MR. COTTLE: I mean for the basis that — 
that — that Dr. Knorpp used it, I have no objection to 
that, you know. 
THE COURT: Okay. So you don't think there's 
any real contested facts or anything then? 
MR. COTTLE: Yeah. And I really don't 
think — I really don't see the real basis, other than 
Dr. Knorpp used it, and that's fine. 
THE COURT: Well, let me ask you this. Do you 
agree that it accurately reflects, you know, what he — 
what --
MR. COTTLE: To be honest with you, I just got 
a copy of it — 
THE COURT: Oh. 
MR. COTTLE: — what, yesterday, and so I 
haven't even looked at it. 
THE COURT: Uh huh. 
MR. COTTLE: I was — So many things came 
yesterday, I kind of have let that go. 
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THE COURT: Uh huh. Is that what you're — 
what this statement was taken for purposes of just 
establishing what happened in the accident and — 
MS. TAYLOR: Because we were anticipating 
having a file review or some kind of IME, we wanted to 
get the Applicant's version of the events, and it was 
relied upon by Dr. Knorpp, so I think it would be 
relevant, and like I said, Mr. Cottle participated in 
this and there were no objections made during — when 
he took the statement. 
THE COURT: Uh huh. 
MS. TAYLOR: As far as I know, it's accurate. 
MR. COTTLE: I would assume that they're 
honest in their transcription, although I would like to 
carefully go through it and my client would too, and if 
there are any problems we can get back to you. 
THE COURT: Yeah. Well, my question is are we 
using this in lieu of testimony, or — or — 
MS. TAYLOR: No. But I would like to have it 
admitted in case there are discrepancies between his 
testimony and what's in the report. 
THE COURT: Uh huh. 
MR. COTTLE: I mean — I mean I think we can 
use it in lieu of testimony couldn't we? I mean do you 
have any problem with that? 
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MS. TAYLOR: 
him about that wasn' 
THE 
MS. 
know — 
MR. 
COURT: 
TAYLOR: 
COTTLE: 
There's more that I'd 
t included in this. 
Uh huh. 
like to ask 
But as far as the basic, you 
I mean if we're going to take 
testimony today, I would object, I would just say she 
could use it 
THE 
on her 
COURT: 
cross and let's just go 
Yeah. Oh, I have this 
from there. 
problem now 
that I'm — I'm going to be running up against here. I 
have a doctor appointment, and I have to go 
a glucose to; 
really quick 
Lerance 
if I'm 
early to do 
test, which means I have to eat 
going to have any lunch here. 
! Let's 
relied 
better 
see, how should 
MS. TAYLOR: 
we 
I 
on the statements 
to have it in 
purposes. 
just -
guess 
it. I 
basis 
THE COURT: 
-I'm going to 
I'll decide how 
'11 mark it as 
— what — what 
evi 
Uh 
go 
do this? 
think because Dr. 
in 
Knorpp 
here that it would 
dence, at least for re 
huh Okay. Well 
ahead and mark it 
much : 
D5. 
need testimony with resp 
MR. COTTLE: I 
S< 
do 
>ect 
don 
I want to rely 
, let 
and 
on i 
D, now, what would 
we need testimony, 
to — 
't need any testimo 
be 
has 
ference 
me 
— and I 
t or use 
be 
we 
ny. 
the 
do 
You 
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can proffer whatever you're going to say, or if you 
don't — 
MS. TAYLOR: Yeah. If you don't want to take 
testimony, I can just let you know what I was going to 
bring out. 
THE COURT: Well, you know, it's not a matter 
of wanting to, it's a matter of is it going to be 
relevant to the medical question that we have. 
MS. TAYLOR: I assumed because Mr. Kimball 
traveled this distance that he had an interest in 
taking the stand. Otherwise, I would have thought we 
could have — 
THE COURT: Well, unless he arranges — 
MR. KIMBALL: I was told I had to be here. 
THE COURT: Yeah. Unless he arranges to be 
excused, he has to be here. 
MR. KIMBALL: I didn't find out — I didn't 
even find out until a week from Friday, this past 
Friday, that I had to be here. 
THE COURT: Yeah. You would have to 
stipulate, Ms. --
MR. KIMBALL: I don't have any money. I had 
to borrow the money to get here. 
THE COURT: Yeah. Ms. Taylor, you would have 
stipulate to him not being here, you know, in order fo 
him to just not show up for the hearing, so if you 
haven't done that, then he's going to show up for the 
hearing. I don't think it was a decision on him or Mr. 
Cottle's part that he needed to be here for some 
reason, it was just a matter of it's his hearing and 
he's got an obligation to show up, so — So I'm just 
wondering is — is there going to be testimony that's 
relevant to, you know — I mean if we've got -- a lot 
of times I will have the Attorneys say what happened in 
the car accident is clearly discussed in the medical 
records, we don't really need to put the Applicant on 
to repeat it, and we don't have any further questions 
about that, and that's really not at issue, and so we 
really don't need the Applicant's testimony. Sometimes 
the Attorneys want testimony with respect to continuing 
symptoms, that kind of thing. A lot of times that also 
is reflected in the medical records. 
MR. COTTLE: He did have some — He did have 
the sinus problems, but that's reflected in the medical 
records too quite clearly. 
MS. TAYLOR: I think all of the relevant 
information is contained in his statement and the 
medical record. 
THE COURT: Okay. Then I can probably, if we 
don't take testimony, go ahead and use the statement in 
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lieu of testimony as far as any factual things. 
MR. COTTLE: I would agree to that. 
THE COURT: Okay. That's the way I'll handle 
that if we don't need testimony, and then I would just 
be reviewing the exhibits and — and the arguments that 
have been made today and make my decision with respect 
to whether or not it's going to go to medical panel. 
If it's going to go to a medical panel, I do a summary 
and I would let Mr. Cottle know about collecting 
x-rays and that kind of thing. If it doesn't go to a 
medical panel, I'll just be issuing an order 
indicating, you know, my reasoning and — and — and 
what I feel the preponderance of the medical evidence 
supports. 
MR. COTTLE: I should say one thing. 
There's -- He's been receiving treatment at Good 
Samaritan Hospital from Dr. Humphreys the last two 
months on these trigger point injections. Ms. Taylor 
asked — indicated that because the Fund did not pay 
Good Samaritan, that they refused to give them their 
medical — the recent medical records, and asked me to 
have the client bring those out. He did so, and, 
unfortunately, I left those at my office. I promised 
Ms. Taylor I'd get her a copy of those, and I would — 
I would like to send — send you a copy of those also. 
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THE COURT: Yes. Yes. If we have some 
updated records, I will go ahead and accept those. 
MR. COTTLE: Okay. So that's the only thing 
that I'll be adding. 
MS. TAYLOR: Your Honor, will there be any 
opportunity after this period to send any kind of brief 
or anything on the issue of whether or not the file 
review constitutes enough? 
THE COURT: If you want to. If you want to 
submit some written argument, I don't have a problem 
with that. It's going — It will take me just a little 
bit to actually get a chance to, you know -- I do these 
in date order and I have other things I'll be dealing 
with immediately and then hopefully will be able to get 
either the order or the summary out within thirty days, 
but, you know, it will probably be just about thirty 
days, so you could have that amount of time to submit 
any written argument that you wanted. 
MS. TAYLOR: Or — I mean I don't want to 
inundate you with a bunch of things, it looks like you 
already have enough to read, if — if your decision is 
not to send it to a panel, at that point submitting 
something? I'd like to avoid doing motion for review. 
MR. COTTLE: Well, that could be handled in a 
motion for review. 
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MS. TAYLOR: It could. 
MR. COTTLE: I mean after the Judge issues her 
order, I mean you're not going to submit a brief at 
that time. 
THE COURT: Uh huh. I can still take it back 
after I issue my order. I can, you know, if you're 
particularly convincing, and I have done it before, I 
have taken things back and sent them to a panel after I 
issue my order. 
MS. TAYLOR: I guess I wouldn't want to do the 
extra work unless I knew that you weren't going to send 
it to a panel. 
THE COURT: Uh huh. 
MS. TAYLOR: Do you know what I mean? 
THE COURT: Uh huh. Uh huh. 
MS. TAYLOR: But if you decided — 
THE COURT: Let's — Let's just do it that 
way. Why don't you go ahead and file a motion for 
review. If you — If I decide not to send it to a 
panel and you feel that was inappropriate, why don't 
you go ahead and do a motion for review. I read all my 
motions for review, get a response, and then decide 
whether I'm going to refer it on to the Commission. 
MS. TAYLOR: Okay. 
THE COURT: Ninety percent of the time I do 
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Commission is obviously 
me anyway, then I 1 
of time rather than 
or five months for 
Commission decision that I know is going to come 
that way anyway, so --
MR. COTTLE: She doesn't file motion 
review though. 
THE COURT : And --
ike to 
a 
down 
for 
MR. COTTLE: Thank you very much, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: I get reversed sometimes too, 
so — Go ahead and adjourn then. 
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out ;by Dr...'Bizal -was!also;-reviewed:,-although here*"againsthis .does ' 
not.pertain .'specifically and directly £o the patient's motor 
vehicle: accident''of'March 15,. -1993'. 
The' evaluation! follow-up -notes :frbm -Dr., MaticJc .fronf dates -inclusive 
of August 15, 1994 through September 20', i'994"were reviewed: 
-The .evaluation and treatment course conducted'"by Dr.-Humphreys" from 
dates,:inclusive;of' Augusjt;2/* 1994:ithrough;November 16,• a9-9*4 were 
also reviewed.. 
•The-.provided medical repordis were1'.also inclusive, of, what appeared 
"to be | a handwritten evaluation report conducted" at the Medical 
•Center-pf Vincennes- on dates inclusive of .-March ,28, .1993 ..and 
^April's',' 1993/^although :i-*caiinot make Jout ?the 'specif ids :of the 
hanjdw^itten-physician signature. Presumably, such documentation is 
that -of .-a Dr. Hedde; 
The\:provided medical records also^included an Emergency, Room visit 
carried- out at Good Samaritan Hospital in Vincennes^, Indiana oh' 
July-22,, .1994: 
The provided medical records also included reports of imaging 
studies and.diagnostic testing procedures conducted from'dates 
inclusive of March.15, 199,3 ,up .to .and..including the last-documented 
study of August 23,:1994.- Such studies included the cervical ' 
spine, left- knee x-rays obtained -on March 15, 1993, left knee MRI 
obtained on April 2 7„.-1993,-paranasal sinus x-rays-obtained 
October'7, 1993,". CT scan .(with-and without contrast) obtained 
October 26,/19'93/ and,CT\scan (without contrast) obtained July 23, 
1994. •' EMG/fNCV* studies completed August 22, 1994, SEP studies" 
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completed August, 22, 1994, as-well' as • cervical -and.brain MRI 
studies perforated August 23; 1994 .were also reviewed. 
The. provided .medical. records" prof ile the case' of a 38-year-old, 
right-handed'"male, who -was involved-in a work-related-motor vehicle 
Accident in Haines'.City, .Florida "on March,15, 1993- Despite- the 
apparent .severity of'this motor vehicle accident., specifically as 
regards ~'t he* „type.' and speed:;6f vehicles, .involved, the patient 
susta£ned'":nb "loss'of • consciousness, or \ documented craniocerebral 
trauma and was /in' fact capable df;;Pcompleting;the "scheduled-delivery 
on that /date 'despite' his."subjective: pain..and--vehicular, damage.. 
Evaluation^ at; a local hospital completed after, Mr, Kimball. 
completed his ^delivery'' demonstrated* "no traumatically .related 
cervical* or left-_knee osseoiis patjxology." ~ !Af ter waiting two weeics 
for repairs, ^ ./Kimball-drove his-vehicle-back to -Indiana, -
although apparently -with, significant-subjective left knee .and 
ceryicothoracic pain. 
Aft.er^returning to .Indiana; initial evaluation was carried, put 
March ;,28> .,1933- Cpres,umably''by ,Dr. iHedde) with referenced diagnostic 
impressions,. of''pjervical •tmiscle" strain and "kneeVetra~in. Evaluation 
with, Dr-, Fenwick,' was carried out' gn April 8, 1993/- This patient 
was .si&se'quent:ly!:r^ physical therapy at 
Vincennetf Orthopedic* Surgery Clinic".- Frpnu April- 8, 1993 through 
July ;21, i993,~ Mr V • Kimball .'received 42 . sessions, of cervical 
ultrasound treatment,. - .The*,patient:' did cbntinue intermittent, 
subsequent, follow-up with Dr. FenWick.*, Further, evaluation of the 
left: knee includes',MRI- completed-April 2l?,;.1933-/ which; demonstrates 
no'significant;abnormalities attributable to the March 15, 1993 
MVA. 
interval improvement of the* patient! s left lenee'symptomatology is 
described in Dr;' Fenwick1 s+report: ' In the recorded-statement of 
December 'e/1994*, Mr/'Kimball offers that he experienced'no* 
significant .or substantial" improvement'with, the provided course of 
treatment as directed, by Dr. Fenwick. .However, this is at some 
variance; with.the medical, documentation 'from Dr. Fenwick -
specifically in -referring .to physician" documentation of July 13, 
1993«# f whereupon .Dr. T^nwick; actually documents near-complete* 
resolution of the'patfient^s neck pain, save-for-residual pain of 
the lpwer cervical /upper thoracic spine. Dr. Fenwick opines ,an 
expectation o"f. complete resolution of any residual symptomatology 
within'the proceeding}- two ^ eeks.. ; At follow-up with Dr. 'Fenwick on 
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July- 22.;: 1?93„:. Mr. •
 :Kimb,all f"£s ^ released: to . return".to work. 
IntracorpXrecpramends . f i le ; closure" !effective-..July.;23./ 199*3 
Mr..: Kimball-apparently returned. t a .work-as -a tankerdr iver 
e f f e c t i v e July .2-3 /
 :i993-v "" 'In. the 'position-: as' a'; tanker .driver,'.Mrr. 
Kimball'" i s .hot "required to./provideL heavy.^anuali;irvaterials handling. 
Although reference- is , -.made i-to sped i f i c l i ft ing^ recommendations'.for 
return* t o ; wo.fkv^  l i f t i n g 
xeatr ic t ibn.Jn: h i s recorded;; statement
 § of 1 December. 6;,... 1.994)., no 
f ormai* f uhctiohal - capacity ^evaluation •: i s 'completed -in - the July. 1993 
time."frame.-16; ob jec t i fy Ite.'; Kimball'/s capacit ies for s a f e manual 
materials handling^ 
Mr;,.,"Kimball • follows up, with- Dr,:-Een^icJc <?n,< October, 4>- .1993, with--, 
notat ion -of' the.'pat lent'; s f j^rsisterit ' l e f t - knee, pain -and1 work- .: 
r e l i t e&pairi .it.jthe. bafee^bf"t:he-.-.neck..,.' Cta that .date, 'Mr.: .Fehwick . 
,opines,."that. 'Mr:.;..Kimball i s .at MMI, 
Mr.';*.Kimball cpritinues to; work as a tanker: 'driver,:. apparently with 
pers i s t en t subject ive cervicotkoric ic^ April-of 1994.. 
Mr^^Kiniball /changes -his enipioymeht -withJyarious.^trucking companies 
during1 :t^s^";fcime fxame> • -appa-rebtly^ " 
However,- -in- chianging; his •.en^loymeiit^ -Mr. [Kimball .continues- to work 
as*;a- thinker';t2^.ck':-<iriver^until the'Aprilj.'of 1994 time .frame.; Mr, 
Kimball-doea ;6f f, er that he --ikae' apparently/taken. off work for a 
period" of -one ^ rnonth by Dr'. fRohrer Jin- the [October of 1993Vtime •*• 
•frame/^secoxiddryftq s i n u s i t i s
 : ^d/assoc iated: headaches. However; 
Mr..'. .Kimball, does; of f er! - that-.he did return* to- his/en^lbymentva's,"' a ' 
tanker .driver, jaf iter- an; absence'-of
 :lone month. , As.»noted-above./ Mr.-
Kimbali eventually select edj.to terrniriate -his' en^loymeht "as a tianker 
driver -'secondary: due- to' disputes- over, babk- pay, as. wetll .as.'.' 
se'c'ondairy: t o ' subjective'.worsening/:of .hifij. back pain and headaches.. 
In,reference "to:.,',the;provided -medical records,- ••it
 rshpuld be noted 
that Dr'.;; Fenwick make8;• no-mention |.pf ^headache .symptomatolpgy as . 
re la ted to.the^Jiarch 15,-. 1993/imotbr vehicle-accident --even with 
documentation .up; and: until;* the October-4;, ;1993: time -frame': .;"' 
Headache .symptomatblogy noted.Jby Dr..' Rbhrer in the' October :1993; -is 
referenced "specifically;as! re la ted t o the"patient's onset of" 
s i n u s i t i s - in/ the-, October -.of-J 1*993. ••time friame..../Head. CT/i'maging. 
ordered, on October.: 2.S, 1993.fas.* requested1* to evaluate for.'his 
s inus i t i s - . 
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After • .terminating; his employment', as. a tanker driver' some, time ;in 
Aprii\bf a9."94v.:Mr. ^Kdmfcall s^ cures-:ei^^ a salesperson, of a 
vacuum .system •-. an* employment ^situatioir that, .requires .Mr .Kimball 
to take; the Vacuum.'system to. various .locations; • set.it :up #- and 
demonstrate its-; £ unctions..,, ,,'Mrl Kimball of fears- that ..this system 
weighs:-3-10^pounds*: (again- reference the r-ecorded,.iStatement,.of 
December\:6'.," ,1994')'l 
Mr..-' Kimball:- follows. tip'* with''Dr.. Fenwick, on< July.,11,. 1994 .'with 
apparent recurrence of-ce^ic^ pain:^symptoms "along, with 
intir as capillar pain •• •' Subsequent "tot • t his:; • Mr..- Kimbal 1 i s :r e f err ed 
batk to ^ physicail^ therapy- ••'^ From\ July .11;'/. 1994,/ through"August'. 1, 
1.994;'Mr. 'KimbaIX,;receiyediten; ses'.sions'T'of;'physical .therapy 
including .uitrasound^.hot packs and. tractipn.' 
On phe weekend. :6£•* July 22!; ' 1994 , ,^ Mr; Kimball.apparently'!experienced 
.a .-sufficiently.'Severe' headache as'to'prompt him-to seek;emergency" 
evaluation! at -th'ej Emergency".' Room, of Good, Samaritan .Hospital- in/' • 
Vincennes-,'; liidiana-.-'* -'Concerns • over :'-possible 'cerebral aneurysm...' 
apparently'promptedv1head CT" imaging.:- Apparently ^  the patient *was* 
eventually f el-t. .Vjtp- -have a- developed-
 tar, tensdon/muscle -.contraction " 
headache. 
Mr.- Kimball .follows^up with'/Dr. ,Fenwick• on' July .25/'.' 1994-. :'After 
this;;evaluatibrl7:", Dr. •. Fenwick provides ;the 'patient':if\pr;e.s!crdption 
Lfor. a: one-week' work • releasee' Af t£r follow-up with ,Dr. , Penwick' oh" 
July2:8r.:. 1994., '/Mr L ;'Kimbali; is. referred to .the offices, of .lL- J. 
'Matick" D.0-. :Dr.:f Fenwicfc-again''provides -the patient, .with ar 
prescription .'fdr-'the!,patient to be,;qff Workjintil' a follow-up . 
appqintment^^ July 28, 1994.. 
Evaluation with "-H .'Ji.. ;MaticJc< -D- O.,«; • is . carried. outf on August 15, 
19941-. ^ Despitev'a.compietelyi norma and" 
;despite -the fact ft hat 'Mr''-:!, Kimball ;had,"", already§ undergone i contrast • 
and noncontrast'ixtiead/CT imaging, on October :26i. 1993 and. July 22; -.' 
199.4'' (both studies were' interpreted'as normal) , -Dr.. .Matick orders a 
multitude., of diagnostic procedures including, brain and cervical 
MRI,.EEG, EMC/NCtf ^studies^f and SEP; studies*-/ All, of 'the ; . -• 
.electiophysiblojgib: studies L" (.including. JEEG/. SEP;,'and. EMG/NCV. 
studies.) are. subsequently completed- by Dr. Matick. 
Brain, dnd; cezyxcal MRX stuaxes competed August 23, 1994 .were 
interpreted •as^normal..' • SEP/.studies' completed':"August' 22r /.1994 'were 
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felt*-to be-consistent with.|mild, upper-extremity peripheral 
neuropathy/ although no abnormalities were ,demonstrated^ on EMG/NCV 
studies of August 22, 1994.' The EEG studies completed August 17, 
1994, were also-interpreted as.normal„ 
Dr.. Matick prescribes 'Elavil - (amitriptylineX for Mr. Kimball on 
August 15, 19;94,^ and refers jMr, Kimball to the offices of Dr-
Humphreys for pain clinic "treatment 
Apparently, Drl Humphreys.had already,evaluated Mr,. Kimball on 
August 2, 1994i. this as adjudged from the provided medical 
documentation.! - From August 2, 1994 through November 16^ 1994, Mr. 
Kimball received at least 15 separate sessions of" trigger point -and 
suboccipital therapeutic] injections-. During this series of 15 
separate,.sessions of injection therapy, Mr. Kimball received in 
excess of 100 injections!. ^During this "course 'of treatment under 
TDr. Humphreys, jjftr. Kimball,'remained on amitriptyline (aplparently 
under tlae direction of Dr.IMatick) as well as Darvocet-N 100. 
The patient's tecorded^telephone statement of-December 6, 1954 
references continuation pt' therapeutic injection^,, continued up to 
the December 6j/ 1994 tiitfe/frame, suggesting that Mr.. .Kimball *had 
apparently r_ecjeived mor,e! than 15 -sessions of injectiorf therapy, 
although the-exact number-is-not documented an* the. provided medical 
records. Mr. Kimball-oflfers that the provided therapeutic 
injections have helped maintain control of headaches, although no 
mention' is made "of any improvement of the cervicothoracic muscle 
pain. 
The patient underwent aii IME under Dr. Yelton on October 5, 1994, 
who opines that the patient *& condition is consistent with chronic 
cervical and aTcapulothoradic strain with headache symptomatology 
consistent with this- condition. Dr. Yelton'recommends continuation 
of muscle relaxants, trigger point injections, Elavil, and emphasis 
on a. home progjratm of * rehabilitation including local heat and 
massage. Dr. TYelton offers that treatment may be required for an 
additional six| months and ,that the patient was not at that time at 
MMI. 
An independent!- and objective review of the provided medical records-
would offer a ('conclusion that Mr. Kimball, initially sustained a 
left knee contjusion and ("cervicothoracic strain related to his 
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work-related motor vehicle accident of March 15, 1993, Despite the 
primarily passive nature of his 42 sessions of. provided physical 
therapy (April 8, 1993 through July 21, 1993), the treating medical 
personnel (Dr; Fenwick) documents near complete«resolution of Mr. 
Kimball's symptomatology (circa July 8, 1993) and released Mr. 
Kimball topfull-time'work as a tanker driver effective July 23, 
1993. A follow-up note from Dr- Fenwick dated October 4,* 1993, 
declared Mr, 'Kimball at MMI. 
Mr. Kimball did not undergo -a formal functional capacity evaluation 
in the July 19-93 time frame 'to objectively determine his safe 
capacities for manual materials handling- Reference is made to a 
50-pound lifting restriction -- although as av tanker driver, Mr. 
Kimball was apparently not. required to perform significant lifting. 
My. Kimball objectifies his capacity "to return to work as a tanker 
driver, securing employment with two separate tracking firms in the 
time between July 23, -19r93 and April of 1994. . Mr. Kimball offers 
that he elected' to terminate his employment withr a trucking firm 
secondary to* issues of payment, as welX as subjective worsening of 
his cervicotiibracic symptoms*. Despite such worsening of symptoms, 
Mr., Kimball does noti-seek any further medical follow-up with Dr. 
Fenwick until" July 11, 19-94 - some <three months after he already 
elected to terminate", his ^ employment with the-trucking firms-
Mr- Kimball "offers that he received treatment from Dr. Rohrer in 
the interval of April of 1994 through July of 1994- However, the 
provided medical recordssfrom,the offices of Dr. Rohrer, 
'specifically-in relation * to the. time frame-between April 2&, 1994 
and October 13, 1994 make no mention of treatments provided either 
.directly or indirectly related to Mr- Kimball's cervicothoracic 
complaints- Provided medical records from the offices of Dr*. 
Rohrer from* the April 26,' 1994 through October 13, 1994 time frame 
relate to treatments*^specifically as directed to Mr. Kimball's 
history of sinusitis." 
The issue as to Mr, -Kimball's headache symptomatology is not 
completely clear. The first) mention of any headache symptomatology 
is made by Dr. Rohrer specif jically -as related toJMr. Kimball J s 
sinusitis (October 25, 19-93 report). - Note that this first-mention 
of any" headache symptomatology is, made nearly seven months and ten 
days after the- March 15, 1993 MVA,,and specifically related to Mr. 
Kimball's sinusitis. Contrast and noncontrast liead CT scan 
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obta ined ^October 26;;••i\9 ,94\.was--iinterpr1etedas. normal. Again,-
prescriptipns'i .knd treatments •provided by_ Dr. .Rohrer to-Mr.. Kimball 
from.; Oqtober '••7,/i' 19.93. through * Obtoter 13,'". 19.94 - are s p e c i f i c a l l y -
r e l a t e d . t d Hr .* •  'K imba l l v s - s inus i t i ' s / and r e l a t e d h^iadaches,.-
I t • i s not -unt i l . Mr. ;3Cimbaii".'! s presentation''' t o aiOBR. f a c i l i t y •,on 
July.:,.;22,: 1*9.94, i :with what.".: was"; e v e n t u a l l y ; determined t o .be. *a '. 
t e n s i o n / m u s c l e 1'cbntractibn headacHp,".that,,any;mention i s made :of 
hieada'che/s^ptomatplb .• that,'. r e l a t e d / t o s i n u s i t i s 
r e l a t e d h^a:daches.V*, ; Tension/muscl^' contract ionv headaches are' n o t an 
unusual<or l inic^e • condi t ion f o r .any human Being;,:: At near ly , s i x t e e n 
m o n t h s - ^ d . o 15^.1993^ MVA;/: the o n s e t .of-' 
tension/muscle.' , c o n t r a c t i o n 'headaches i n an i n d i v i d u a l : w i th a 
"history! of I s inus. , r e l a t e d : headache s^  who , s m o k e s / ^ d i who- has..had a 
h i s tory , . o f deryicothip.racic s t ra in ' ijwpuldnoi ;beT u n e q u i v p c a l l y or 
• t o t a l l y -related" t o ; the March; 15"; 3#9.3/ motor .Vehicle;, a c c i d e n t . 
It" might • be reasonable -to, ,al low"that/ a combination of f a c t o r s . led ^ 
Jtpl t h i s "tens ibn/muscie / on" J u l y . 22.,. 
'199,4}"- al'thbugli-.ito-relatVAthei rembtV onset,' ,of . this"headache,"direct ly 
and p r e c t o m ^ a n t l y ^ some s i x t e e n 
m o n t ^ and; one :.week pr ior , t o . July;'22 / ::. :l?94 !; :'does'not f o l l o w any"-. 
known-• medica l -rat ionale^' / ; ,The -dec±Bion-£6- proceeH-with^CJ imaging 
o f t h e -head a t t h e / t i ^ ^ .'--1994'" 
; . ( s p e c i f i c a l l y .to. evaluate" -fori a cerebra l : aneurysm) • would -hot b e a t . 
all.* fe latfed • to;[the" patient;s;';Marc.hj';15,:' 19-93 MVAv. ::Any / s i g n i f i c a n t ' 
;craaii.pcerebral: -trauma••sustained .asr a r e s u l t of
 :§the';-patient \.&\ 
•March; 15 ; • vl993-^MVA.would:have beeiit^very-adequately, a n d * s u f f i c i e n t l y 
•evaluated.;by \CT/, imaging; obta ined :o?i1TOctqbe.r../26^; '1993.*,' a;"study . 
:Prdered;-at ' t l iat . t ime. trame to* eva l^a te^the . p a t i e n t ; s s i n u s i t i s 
r e l a t e d jheadachiesj: I t . shbiild be ;noted t h a t ; thisu,"study• was 
. inte'roreted -as Icot^leteTv^normal 1 
•Dr., -waticJc;s evaluation-, ana p r e s c r i b e d "diagnost ic "studies; of; 
August i5>,>l?9"4!, ' r a i s e s ^s igni f icant ' : concernsv. •-.'•Brain'' MRI would' not 
have betoocphsilderedj m e d i c a l l y n e c e s s a r y ; Mr• Kimball.1 s .neurologic , 
examination-, on "mult iple o c c a s i o n s demonstrated no /abnormal-iti'e's.:' 
l^irthermore,; MrusKimball; iiad. already, undergone; c o n t r a s t and 
noncontras t ;hea£' CT imaging on October' 26, 1993 'axijd•;July• 22,' '199.4 : r 
both, s tudies ' were "interpreted' as ^normal *.': Agaizi, /any. 'si'gnif l e a n t 
/craniocerebral! . / trauma-'spec^ - to*the March 15, 1994 
•MVA wbuld- haVe;beeh, c l e a r l y ' m a n i f e s t , and c l i n i c a l l y apparent; e i t h e r . 
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by neurologic examination or CT imaging obtained prior to Mr, 
Kimball's- evaluation ,with*Dr. Ma-tick, on August 15/ '1994. Again, 
any ;eignif leant" craniocerebral trauma amenable" to treatment and 
specifically related^to thermotorrvehicle .accident of March 15, 
1993, would have been demonstrated" by CT imaging obtained'on 
October 2&, 1993i 
Mr .^ .Kimball never manifested any- documented signs or symptoms 
consistent with or suggestive of seizure or seizure-type activity 
As suchr EEG would*iiot have,,been'considered medically necessary. 
Evaluation for- cervi'cal pathology Jwould have been sufficiently" 
evaluated'by C-spine MRI.^  , To order C-spine MRI, 'EMG/NCV studies, 
and/'SEF studies, represents an inappropriate, shotgun approach *„ 
without rational clinical decisionmaking processes. As such, -while 
it would have- been considered arguably reasonable to proceed with 
C-'spine. MRr (specifically .to. objectify traumatically,induced 
cervical'pathology, amenable |to treatment that may have developed 
secondary to the .March 15,^1993 MVA) it would not have been 
considered medically appropriate.,or necessary to order C-spine MRI, 
SEP ouid -EMG/NCV studies 'alt*one time* 'Dr. Matick is welcome to 
respond to this issue. 
Mr. JKimball"&, apparent persistent symptomatology at, the time frame 
of-presentation to the services oifj'Dr, Humphreys-on August 2, 1994 
would-'have been consistent .with chronic, cervicothoracic .myofascial 
pain,. - Acute treatment for myofascial trigger point pain can, and 
oftenNdoes include judicious1and intermittent use of trigger point 
therapeutic injections- Use of therapeutic injections fpr chrcriic 
myofascial- pain is less-well" accepted, although arguably 
reasonable, if judiciously utilized in an individual who 
experiences significant and substantial and prolonged benefit from 
such, injection «therapy. Eve(n in «uch cases, trigger point 
injection therapy would still be recommended on an intermittent 
basis and only for those exacerbations of paxn not responsive to 
more conservative modalities* such as oral medications te.g., 
tricyclic antidepressants},, moist- heat or cold, therapeutic 
stretching and active exercises including a cardiovascular 
conditioning 'program. 
Dr. Humphreys' administration of well over 100 therapeutic 
injections over more than US treatment sessions is indefensible and 
follows- no- known or reasonlably accepted standard T^ f liberally 
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reasonable-care for-individuals with myofascial pain. Particularly 
in'a patient with chronic" \pam wHo failed-to; eacper^ence/significant 
and
 rsubatantial^ long-term benef it^from the provided therapeutic 
injeptioriflT, Dr.- Humphreys would-be placecLin a'position to provide 
significant and substantial proof-of medical "necessity as to why 
sucli-injection therapy-was continued beyond-the first_ three 
treatment sessions.. , This" form of - treatment, (e.g/,
 t trigger point 
injections) -is- ats besf a/.paTIiative. 'and "transient -form of * treatment 
w2iich,V if ^cohtiniked. indefinitely, ^ promotes treatment dependency. 
Nonmalignant pain,.particularly in individualsvwithout 
bbjectifiable patliology/ does not constitute af/condition warranting 
either .temporary j or -permanent- disability. In'^ an era./in-which 
individuals who have" sustained guadriplegia1 and" paraplegia • 
routinely complete' appropriate* antf"reasonable -rehabilitation within 
four-to'sik months, "after their injuries and( thpnHgoi-on tow~re-ehter 
productiver*life,;|it *is^  beyond\r~easpnable medical comprehension"'that 
an individual.who^haafsustained n&thing more oBjectifiably sterious 
than a knee contusion-and/soft tiksue muscle-pain is now.„considered 
even remotely'deserving-of:'a designation of!any'form> type gr 
duration of disability. 
'None 9f the" tre'ating medical personnel involved inr Mr* Kimball4 s 
care- provide^ any ^ objective '-documentation Jto * validate a., designation 
of-either temporary or permanent disability!: The entire basis'for 
Mr.. Kimball•s designated releases!from work, is predicated' upon 
subjective^ symptomatology 
A*physical.therapy evaluation carried out_on November 8^/1994, 
purportedly to assess Mr.- Kimball^ s' functional 'capacities7 .provides-
nom significant,or*substantial information to support any disability 
designation. » The^  -referring physician-(Dr.- Fenwipk) referred ""Mr. 
Kimball to this .physical therapy evaluation T'on November 8, X934 
with a,, ten-pound lifting.restriction - thus .not allowing-for aitrue 
assessment of Mr, Kimball's safe or maximum.manual materials 
handling capacity. 
Summa'rily, Mr. Kimball\s disability designation and work releases 
are not supported orj-substantiated by .objective criteria or 
objective information necessary tciVrender such" a^  disability status 
Furthermore, an independent;, review^raises questions ;as* tte what 
occupation' or vocation Mr. Kimball?was considered- disabled."' Do^the 
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Pacfe.:-!!"" 
tr^ting/.phystciaiiie"; toc^^tKia^JMr;^ iKxmbal;! ;,haid: .elected to. germinate 
h i s ^ o ^ ^ ^ • iri; April,-,qf" J1L994y: .and 
ttiatVat: the-;:time!<bf • &is presexitratibn 'tp.vDrV. .Yeriwicfc oiivJuly ';ll> 
\193^f/phe)[^t^€tn€' !had' already ^witrchfed: h i s - employment r as* a; vacuum 
•'cleaner -sales, Irebreseintative ?•"'; 
Tovdeclare-'S^ iclearky•• oxie^  must: .know -what -type^of 
.c^c^patioxi: ior^yo'ieati^^ ' ibn^er 
ca^abie b -^ *;^e. Mr:^ ;:Kii& medical. 
:p$fspxihel rdeclafJ^ vdisabled. fipm; perfpfn&ng ;&nyand 
al;l*:;pccupat:i^  
-docixwe^ -.areY'they "making .sucii-:a:-decision? 
RECQMMENDA^IONi 
1 Smoking cessation. 
2 TerminateTinj^citipn; therapy:a There ..is-lack;\of;.Vany,.longterm,: 
reff icacy]ur: t^t^^pi^i^suc^. iirjectionv;therapy^ i s - p ^ i i ^ x y e 
at:''be^'t^y^^ ,Cthe~ther^^ ec£ibiCkerrie'a^ai•. " 
proVided^^ ;•J-Ki^hreysV.foXtows no;|;3raown;^standardv'pf cafe 
ffor\this; bondit:iioix:I-and.'-served only-to^-promote "treatment 
3,.. The pat ient ~ will" ' ^ encouragedjltp-ibeginv^ah; 
aerobi c / c^dipv^s ciilar- dohditiioning^rogfata, 
4.. This, -patientysh^^ 
i g ^ e r i e ^ 
in^im£zV:ii^ ' 
5;. ftecpiraaeiid^ ^muscle .-relaxant :and 
nonsteroidal "*Mt i-±nf £ -- Nbhe.;;bf ~ tHe'se 
B^ibationsV 
l o n g - t e l e c o n t r o l "ofr"m^fasciair^ ty^peV.jpa'iri£; •'• P^rthefmbre>^both „ 
promote treatment, dependencyV 
&. Recbrnftend^ vo
 : ref ezjraX. This':p.atientTrauWt" 
.tajce']:|3fi:jtlye.-.re^bhsibiiity' :f p£;'tis:; O*KI; conditipn r^a,d: begin to; 
IpbJt $ c ^ 
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?-. To : btj.ec ti-fy • t h i s . patient'.• s-; /safe.* manual. .mat er ials/handlingr. "I 
would"recommend^ 
.fevaluition;; tp„ object ify/h^^ ;-JUfbrrriai: 
functional" ^ a p i c i a. f ive^posit ion 
gr ip v| strength ' dynambmiBt ry. ;test . 
Mr.j 'KimbalT sHbuld.bej aware^that referral for^ such .a-.formal 
functional'::.capa«ty:-eyaluati:oii; p^abes^him.- in,'t-he* position^of 
yk i idat ing;:,b*; invalidating' his; own conditibn^T -;Incons.i^ t^ntL*. 
TOd^hbn^erifiahlje pe^f brifiance -on ^these';. tee ting; parameters w i l l 
only;, -serve'.Jtp -ohj^ecti'fy' that-.l-.^ irv"- / K i g a l i ; i s ; of feririg;' the*: 
exantiLner\'^ ' e . f fo^iv^rc^p±ng'^. concern-of 
his'vdesi-resy.t6. w i l l f u l l y 'mislead the medicar '^  Such 
i n c p n ^ s t ent?' anS;7nbnv^:i'f iafil"e; ~t es ting.i'paramet er s7 wpulS-!oriiy.-
Xr\mc£ter^\\ K i ^ a ' 3 ^ employment I issues,; 
:and.:Certainly,^'iace-: himf^in aai ie~ss;tfcan Sof^etitive^po^^ 
^secure; future ;^cat ipnal •or:-;.op .-:. "Consistent 
and,-Verif i a b i e ^ t e s ^ :wpuld::allbw ..for*":the" treating 
jnedica^personneil "tp^bBj'ecti^rMr.:/Kimb^I1sV.safe 'manual*'.>:'-^  X 
^ t ^ r i a l ^ 
regards vocational: capapit-ies:; 
SUMMARY .OF MKDrCAL ^RECORDS iEXLS-KEVIgWsC-A •Tf^w''&t-'%Tn^-^r6vi:^d^ 
medical-/records^wQuld'-alloY^an1 • independent, f i l e x review",';to .'conclude 
that
 ;":thef-;patxent ;:has^Bustained;;t^ 'secondary -tor 
his^wprk^r^ Chicle/.a'pbident .1993 .•' 
A. Aeftcldieejcori^^ 
anduced-^pat^ i or 'iwiichj ;f^ther^.feyal^ticm. -and: -treatment 
would rfcet- considere;d. jne.<&cal^ 
B. GervicotTipracic--tauscnilbligai^^pus.'• soft• "tissue
 v s t rain, 
.appax^tlyTi^i^ .persistencev'o'f , > ^ ^ t o ^ t p l 6 g y : that the; 
•patient-would Iriowvie. corns ide^ed:to-'have^chronic 
oervxcbtho'rXcxc i.myp^  
-Although notation-1 i s : nUde'o^^the ^develbpmeritr.bf:" tens ion/muscle 
contraction jfteadaches j tJuly j22|;r .i'954r)'j' ;thercausal- .and" tempbral 
i felatednessfxti:/-t^ese;*'neadaciies!^as • regards;*::^ h^t -patient! s • motor i-yehxcle •"accMdn^ l4^j^93-; ~M^ 
; prpyided''me^ .": . C e^Vriy*;- \ the: onset: -of tension1/"' 
;muscle'[ contraction ;he^a:ches^b.u:ldwbe • consideredjjnulti-
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f a c t o r i a l , cefta*anlyN-related in part :to-.the p a t i e n t i s h i s tory 
•of • rchroxk.c.\8i^ continued smoking: and history 
of ;previoue^ce*ryicothbracic* mus'cXe strain." 
DISABiiriTT STATUS.: - * The -prbyided^medical:' records medical records -db-
not^pxbyide- objec t ive 'documentation-*or infbrmatdon./ta^substantiate-
any typej/duration^, preform ••of £eraqr_ary- or p a r t i a l d i s a b i l i t y ; 
Although;it: is"* cer ta in ly JwfLthih' the realm of .medical • p o s s i b i l i t y , to 
ccinclude jtHat -Mr.:' Kimb'air does exderienbe tat; :least some .degree- of" 
p e r s i s t e n t bervicp£horac±c}pain (with.or without^headacHes) , -in; and 
bf "itse l f th! is :does; .n6t/const i t^4^a "disability^ v Indeed*, -the 
provided medical"records -provide iWittl*e:.objective .;documentation to 
••stibstan*tiate"Mris Kimball*1 &':apparen!t\subjective symptomatology;. 
'.Ifjyouto18ave"-,7my further.questional tor concerns,, /or-Mf^-Mr. -Kimball 
present s-\tot -the j state., of, Utah •"for «|a\ su f f i c i en t ;time*'' t o .conduct a 
hands-on-,examination/, 'I -would1 be^njappy-to review'his .status*' at'some 
future time; 
*5incei?ely:;ypurs , 
Scott. TKnatpp/ Ifjfe-. 
SJC/-BMT36. 
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Workers 
Compensation 
Fund of Utah Safe and Sound Thinking 
T. Jeffery Cottle 
Attorney at Law 
387 W Center 
Orem, UT 84057 
February 14, 1995 
RE: Claimant: 
File No.: 
Inj Date: 
Employer: 
John R. Kimball 
93-17987 
3-15-93 
Stampede Trucking 
Dear Mr. Cottle: 
Pursuant to Rule 490-l-4(J) of the Industrial Commission of Utah, the Workers Compensation 
Fund, as the defendant in this matter, has the responsibility of compiling the joint exhibit of medical 
records to be submitted for consideration by the Administrative Law Judge. 
We recently received notice that this matter has been scheduled for hearing on March 7, 1995 
before Judge Barbara A. Elicerio. It will be necessary for the exhibit to be submitted by February 28, 
1995. All of the medical records will be available for your review at our office approximately two 
weeks prior to the hearing date. Please call ahead of any visit to ensure swift access to the records. If a 
visit to our office is inconvenient, you may simply submit by mail or fax (288-8038) any records which 
you feel may not be contained in our files. Rule 490-1-4 provides that you must submit those records 
to us two weeks prior to the scheduled hearing. 
Please contact Shelly Stephens at 288-9250 if you need additional information regarding the 
preparation of the joint medical exhibit. 
After all records have been assembled, a copy may be obtained at our office one week prior to 
the hearing or will be delivered to you at the time of hearing. 
Sincerely, 
WORKERS COMPENSATION FUND OF UTAH 
Michael J. Bowman 
Legal Adjuster 
288-8055 
MB:if 
392 East 6400 South Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 Phone (801) 288-8000 
»(fl 
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March 20, 1995 
T . JEFFERY COTTLE 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
387 W E S T C E N T E R 
O R E M , UTAH 8 4 0 5 7 
TELEPHONE: (801)222-9700 
S.LC. TEL: (801)328-2240 
FAX NO.: (801)224-9960 
The Honorable Barbara Elicerio 
Administrative Law Judge 
Industrial Commission of Utah 
P.O. Box 146615 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-6615 
Re: 
DOI: 
Emp: 
Your Case No: 
Dear Judge Elicerio: 
John R. Kimball 
03-15-93 
Stampede Trucking 
94-967 
Per your request at the recent Hearing, enclosed are Mr. Kimball's latest medical records for 
the treatment he had received for the three months before the Hearing. 
Sincerely, 
T. Jeffery Cottle 
TJCrdj 
Enclosure 
cc: Carrie Taylor, Attorney at Law 
MAR 2 7 1995 
BARBARA ELICERIO 
CJJ22 
Tab I 
Utah Admin. Code R568-1-4. Pleadings and Discovery. 
A. For the purposes of Section 63-46b-3, U.C. A., all adjudicative proceedings for workers' 
compensation and occupational disease claims shall only be commenced by the injured worker or 
dependent filing a request for agency action with the Commission. The Administrative Law Judge 
is afforded discretion in allowing intervention of other parties pursuant to Section 63-46b-9, 
U.C.A. The Application for Hearing is the request for agency action. All such applications shall 
include supporting medical documentation of the claim where there is a dispute over medical 
issues. Applications without supporting documentation will not be mailed to the employer or 
insurance carrier for answer until the appropriate documents have been provided. 
B. Whenever a claim for compensation benefits is denied by an employer or insurance carrier, 
the burden rests on the applicant to initiate the action by filing an Application for Hearing with the 
Commission. 
C. When an Application for Hearing is filed with the Commission, the Commission shall 
forthwith mail a copy to the employer or to the employer's insurance carrier. 
D. The employer or insurance carrier shall have 30 days following the date of the mailing of the 
application to file a written answer with the Industrial Commission, admitting or denying liability 
for the claim. The answer should state all affirmative defenses with sufficient accuracy and detail 
that an applicant may be fully informed of the nature of the defense asserted. All answers shall 
include a summary and categorization of benefits paid to date on the claim. A copy shall be sent 
to the applicant or, if there is one, to the applicant's attorney by the defendant. 
E. When an employer or insurance carrier fails to file an answer within the 30 days provided 
above, the Commission may enter a default against such employer or insurance carrier. The 
Commission may then set the matter for hearing, take evidence bearing on the claim, and enter an 
Order based on the evidence presented. Such defaults may be set aside by following the 
procedure outlined in the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Said default shall apply to the defendant 
employer or insurance carrier and shall not be construed to deprive the Employers' Reinsurance 
Fund or the Uninsured Employers' Fund of any appropriate defenses. 
F. Where the answer denies liability solely on the medical aspects of the case, the applicant, 
through his/her attorney or agent, and the employer or insurance carrier, with the approval of the 
Commission or its representative, may enter into a stipulated set of facts, which stipulation, 
together with the medical documents bearing on the case in the Commission's file, may be used in 
making the final determination of liability. 
G. When deemed appropriate, the Commission or its representatives may have a pre-hearing or 
post-hearing conference. 
H. Upon filing of the Answer, the defendant may commence discovery with appropriate sets of 
interrogatories. Such discovery should focus on the accident event, witnesses, as well as past and 
present medical care. The defendant shall also be entitled to appropriately signed medical releases 
to allow gathering of pertinent medical records. The defendant may also require the applicant to 
submit to an independent medical examination to be conducted by a physician of the defendant's 
choice. Failure of an applicant to comply with such requests may result in the dismissal of a claim 
or a delay in the scheduling of a hearing. 
I. Commission subpoena forms shall be used in all discovery proceedings and must be signed, 
unless good cause is shown for a shorter period, at least one week prior to any scheduled hearing. 
J. All medical records shall be filed by the employer or its insurance carrier as a single joint 
exhibit at least one week before the scheduled hearing. Claimant must cooperate and submit all 
pertinent medical records contained in his file to the employer or its insurance carrier for the joint 
exhibit submission two weeks in advance of a scheduled hearing. Exhibits are to be placed in an 
indexed binder arranged by care provider in chronological order. Exhibits should include all 
relevant treatment records with the exception of hospital nurses notes. 
K. The Administrative Law Judge must be notified one week in advance of any proceeding 
where it is anticipated that more than four witnesses will be called, or where it is anticipated that 
the hearing of the evidence will require more than two hours. 
L. Decisions of the presiding officer in any adjudicative proceeding will be issued in accordance 
with the provisions of Section 63-46b-5 or 63-46b-10, U.C.A. 
M. Any party to an adjudicative proceeding seeking review of an Order by the Agency may file a 
written request for review in accordance with the provisions of Sections 63-46b-12, 63-46b-13, 
63-46b-14, 63-46b-15, and 63-46b-16, U.C.A. A Motion for Review of any order entered by an 
Administrative Law Judge may be filed pursuant to the provisions of Section 63-46b-12, U.C.A. 
Unless so filed, the Order will become the award of the Commission and will be final. If 
appropriately filed, the Administrative Law Judge may: 
1. Reopen the case and enter a Supplemental Order after holding such further hearing and 
receiving such further evidence as may be deemed necessary, 
2. Amend or modify the prior Order by a Supplemental order, or 
3. Refer the entire case to the Commission for review under Section 35-1-82.53, U.C.A. 
If the Administrative Law Judge enters a Supplemental Order, as provided above, it shall be final 
unless a Motion for Review of the same is filed with the Commission. 
N. In formal adjudicative proceedings, the Industrial Commission shall generally follow the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure regarding discovery and the issuance of subpoenas, except as the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure are modified by the express provisions of Section 35-1-88, U.C.A., or as 
may be otherwise modified by the presiding officer. 
O. A request for reconsideration of a Commission's Order on Motion for Review may be 
allowed and shall be governed by the provisions of Section 63-46b-13, U.C.A. Any petition for 
judicial review of the Commission's Order on Motion for Review shall be governed by the 
provisions of Section 63-46b-14, U.C.A. 
Utah Admin Code R568-1-9. Guidelines for Utilization of Medical Panel. 
Pursuant to Section 35-1-77, U.C.A., the Commission adopts the following guidelines in 
determining the necessity of submitting a case to a medical panel: 
A. A panel will be utilized by the Administrative Law Judge where: 
1. One or more significant medical issues may be involved. Generally a significant medical issue 
must be shown by conflicting medical reports. Significant medical issues are involved when there 
are: 
(a) Conflicting medical reports of permanent physical impairment which vary more than 5% of the 
whole person, 
(b) Conflicting medical opinions as to the temporary total cutoff date which vary more than 90 
days, and/or 
(c) Medical expenses in controversy amounting to more than $2,000. 
B. A hearing on objections to the panel report may be scheduled if there is a proffer of conflicting 
medical testimony showing a need to clarify the medical panel report. Where there is a proffer of 
new written conflicting medical evidence, the Administrative Law Judge may, in lieu of a hearing, 
re-submit the new evidence to the panel for consideration and clarification. 
C. The Administrative Law Judge may authorize an injured worker to be examined by another 
physician for the purpose of obtaining a further medical examination or evaluation pertaining to 
the medical issues involved, and to obtain a report addressing these medical issues in all cases 
where: 
1. The treating physician has failed or refused to give an impairment rating, 
2. The employer or doctor considers the claim to be non-industrial, and/or 
3. A substantial injustice may occur without such further evaluation. 
D. Any expenses of the study and report of a medical panel or medical consultant and of their 
appearance at a hearing, as well as any expenses for further medical examination or evaluation, as 
directed by the Administrative Law Judge, shall be paid out of the Employers' Reinsurance Fund. 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16. Judicial review - Formal adjudicative proceedings. 
(1) As provided by statute, the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to review 
all final agency action resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings. 
(2) (a) To seek judicial review of final agency action resulting from formal adjudicative 
proceedings, the petitioner shall file a petition for review of agency action with the appropriate 
appellate court in the form required by the appellate rules of the appropriate appellate court. 
(b) The appellate rules of the appropriate appellate court shall govern all additional filings 
and proceedings in the appellate court. 
(3) The contents, transmittal, and filing of the agency's record for judicial review of formal 
adjudicative proceedings are governed by the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, except that: 
(a) all parties to the review proceedings may stipulate to shorten, summarize, or organize the 
record; 
(b) the appellate court may tax the cost of preparing transcripts and copies for the record: 
(I) against a party who unreasonably refuses to stipulate to shorten, summarize, or organize the 
record; or 
(ii) according to any other provision of law. 
(4) The appellate court shall grant relief only if, on the basis of the agency's record, it determines 
that a person seeking judicial review has been substantially prejudiced by any of the following: 
(a) the agency action, or the statute or rule on which the agency action is based, is 
unconstitutional on its face or as applied; 
(b) the agency has acted beyond the jurisdiction conferred by any statute; 
(c) the agency has not decided all of the issues requiring resolution; 
(d) the agency has erroneously interpreted or applied the law; 
(e) the agency has engaged in an unlawful procedure or decision-making process, or has failed to 
follow prescribed procedure; 
(f) the persons taking the agency action were illegally constituted as a decision-making body or 
were subject to disqualification; 
(g) the agency action is based upon a determination of fact, made or implied by the agency, that 
is not supported by substantial evidence when viewed in light of the whole record before the 
court; 
(h) the agency action is: 
(I) an abuse of the discretion delegated to the agency by statute; 
(ii) contrary to a rule of the agency; 
(iii) contrary to the agency's prior practice, unless the agency justifies the inconsistency by giving 
facts and reasons that demonstrate a fair and rational basis for the inconsistency; or 
(iv) otherwise arbitrary or capricious 
